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PREFACE
In 2012, my brother showed me a uniform from World War II that he had recently
framed. It had belonged to my grandfather. I observed a strange patch on the shoulder—a
white “W” imposed over a bright blue background. It was not until four years later while
visiting the National Infantry Museum that I saw a large display with every division patch
from World War II and noticed that same patch from my grandfather’s uniform. It was
the emblem of the 89th Infantry Division. I began to do some casual research, reading that
the 89th Infantry Division did not see any significant combat during the war. Soon after, I
was at the Donovan Research Library at Fort Benning and stumbled upon the 89th
Infantry Division history book from 1947, where my grandfather’s name was listed under
F Company, 354th Infantry Regiment, and my interest was reignited. Rather than
confirming that the 89th Infantry Division had not seen significant combat, further
research showed that his company had suffered severe casualties at one specific battle—
the crossing of the Rhine Gorge. I learned that my grandfather was not present at the
crossing, but I was still curious. I could hardly find anything about it. Then I found an
obscure article online by Oscar Friedensohn describing the horrors of that night.
For years I continually returned to the Rhine Gorge crossing, trying to understand
it. I found other accounts from veterans. I obtained records from the National Archives.
The deeper I dug, the more intriguing it became. Why did the stories from veterans seem
to conflict with the official histories? This thesis is my attempt to explain what happened
in late March 1945 at the Rhine Gorge as well as explore how an obscure battle with
relatively little strategic impact could seriously affect the way we remember the past,
write history, and use that history to navigate the present.
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In the years following World War II, official military records along with news
reports and personal accounts of senior military leaders formed a narrative that
emphasized American exceptionalism and focused on the success of the United States
military. That original narrative became a foundation for foreign policy and military
doctrine, and its characterization of the tactical and operational decisions made by
American military leaders has remained almost entirely unchallenged. This thesis seeks
to reverse that trend by carefully analyzing the tactical and operational aspects of one
specific event, the crossing of the Rhine Gorge by the 89th Infantry Division.
The original narrative of World War II minimizes the Rhine Gorge crossing,
while first-hand accounts from soldiers reveal that significant mistakes were made in the
planning and execution of that operation. The discrepancies require reconciliation
through a careful examination of all available sources. Layering a variety of primary
sources including media outlets, army reports, senior leader accounts, and the statements
of participating soldiers demonstrates the fallibility of the accepted World War II
narrative. The process of layering primary sources also reveals the need for further
analysis of the tactical decisions made by American leaders during World War II.
Furthermore, it necessitates further investigation into the impact of the original narrative
on subsequent policy decisions in the United States.

viii

INTRODUCTION
THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II
A character in Les Miserables, lamenting the death of his comrades on
the 19th century Paris barricades while he lived, triggered a flood of
memories… and it all came rushing back.
—Oscar Friedensohn1

In the early morning hours of March 26, 1945, a handful of wooden boats slipped
into the cool, rushing waters of the Rhine River as American soldiers from the 89th
Infantry Division (89th ID) attempted to cross the last remaining obstacle separating
Allied forces from the heartland of Germany. As the initial group crossed, they were met
with fierce machine gun and canon fire—over 100 soldiers died and many more were
wounded in the ensuing chaos as they frantically attempted to fight the swift current,
finding themselves completely exposed to the weapon systems of the German defenders.2
The 89th ID was not the only unit to cross the Rhine; nor were they the first. The Germans
attempted to destroy all the bridges across the Rhine, but the 9th Armored Division from
First Army found a bridge intact on March 7, 1945 at Remagen. The 21st Army Group
executed a complex airborne and amphibious crossing in northern Germany beginning
March 23, 1945, the same day that the 5th ID crossed in the south near Oppenheim. By
the time the 89th ID crossed, there were already four bridgeheads across the Rhine
spanning the length of the Western Front. (Figure One) While none of the other crossings
would prove as costly as the one executed by the 89th ID with over 200 casualties
sustained in a matter of hours, the story of the 89th ID has been largely ignored

1
2

Oscar Friedensohn, “Red Ran the Rhine,” World War II (Apr. 2005), 36.
Friedensohn, “Red Ran the Rhine,” 39.
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Figure One: Major Allied Bridgeheads across the Rhine River3
or forgotten.4 Why has the crossing of the Rhine Gorge been overlooked? Answering that
question highlights a need for further study of American military tactics in World War II.
Thorough analysis of the Rhine Gorge crossing with particular attention given to
the American soldiers who participated in the battle, American leaders who planned the
attack, and German leaders responsible for the defense of the Rhine proves conclusively
that significant tactical mistakes were made by leaders in the United States Army.
Specifically, they chose a poor crossing site, rushed the operation, inappropriately

3

Base Map adapted from “Rhine River Germany Map,” http://hrsport.nl/, labels added using Microsoft
PowerPoint.
4
Calculating the total cost in terms of soldiers killed and wounded is difficult due to incomplete records.
The 354th IN records claimed 132 killed and 51 wounded from that regiment alone. The 89th ID history
recorded 62 total 353rd IN soldiers killed during the war, and a conservative estimate based on engagements
throughout the war would be that at least half of those soldiers were killed during the Rhine Gorge
crossing. Using a similar ratio for wounded results in 20 additional 353rd IN soldiers wounded. Finally,
between references in the 354th IN reports and the 89th ID history, at least 8 engineers were killed. Based on
the number of engineers participating, 15 total engineers killed and 10 wounded is a safe estimate. Those
records and estimations add up to a total of 178 killed and 81 wounded. Therefore, 259 casualties is a
conservative estimation, although it is entirely possible that over 300 casualties were sustained due to
inconsistencies in records.
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attempted a surprise attack, and failed to sufficiently coordinate for a combined arms
operation. However, these mistakes have not been previously outlined in histories that
detail American military tactics—a genre that revolves around US Army in World War II,
the authoritative historical production of the US Army Center of Military History (often
shortened to the Center of Military History).5 Histories like US Army in World War II,
often referred to as the “green books” because of their original binding, rest on a
foundation of primary sources that consist of news reports, army written reports, and
personal memoirs of senior military leaders. American military mistakes were
occasionally overlooked in the green books as well as the army reports because the
authors were fundamentally concerned with promoting American exceptionalism. The
process of detailing the mistakes made during the crossing of the Rhine Gorge serves as a
model for how American military tactics can be critiqued in a useful manner by
objectively outlining the limitations of existing histories and adding a layer of analysis
that has been lacking.
In a letter written specifically for the men of the 89th ID at the end of the war, the
Division Commander, Major General (MG) Thomas Finley states, “That day we came of

5

More detailed analysis of US Army in World War II will be provided in Chapter Two. The importance of
those volumes and the work of the Center of Military History in general cannot be overstated. US Army in
World War II was a massive project that spanned decades with dozens of volumes and multiple authors,
intended to provide an all-encompassing account of US Army operations. Providing invaluable details, the
project was truly impressive and remains the most authoritative history of American military tactics.
Referred to as the “green books” because of their original binding, the project became a template for later
green books that would cover World War I, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and other military conflicts.
The 21st century publication of volumes covering the Iraq War demonstrates the enduring relevance of
green books. Producing over 600 volumes, most of the titles published by the Center of Military History
can be accessed at https://history.army.mil/catalog/browse/title.html. The influence of the Center of
Military History is one of the core themes weaved throughout this thesis. This work seeks to augment the
valuable contributions of the green books and show that the green books represent a specific perspective,
leaving room for further analysis.
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age, justified our long months of training and gained a fierce incentive to drive on.”6 MG
Finley’s optimistic assessment of the Rhine Gorge crossing foretold how the event would
be remembered; however, other eye-witness accounts portray a more solemn narrative.
One of the veterans from that day, Private First Class (PFC) Oscar Friedensohn, describes
the event in the magazine World War II as “an assault as unthinking and unnecessary, but
also as brave, as the Charge of the Light Brigade.”7 Although their perspective has not
been systematically documented, the veterans of the 89th ID left behind fragments of a
story that conflicts with the official American war narrative.
The sharp contrast between MG Finley and PFC Friedensohn concisely illustrates
the core historical problem that must be addressed: the accounts of soldiers do not match
the authoritative historical works like the green books, which were fundamentally written
from the perspective of senior leaders in the army. Furthermore, historians like Charles
MacDonald, who wrote the green book covering the Rhine Gorge crossing, have
hesitated to fully examine and question some of the tactical decisions made by American
military leaders.8 The solution is to carefully examine a narrow topic using a wide variety
of primary sources in order to refine the original narrative, providing an explanation for
why the historiographical record has not already identified and fully addressed this
research problem.

6

89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division: 1942-1945 (Washington: Infantry
Journal Press, 1947), 16.
7
Friedensohn, “Red Ran the Rhine,” 36.
8
Charles B. MacDonald, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, The
Last Offensive (Washington: Center of Military History, 1973), 234. MacDonald is referenced because he
wrote the green book covering the Rhine Gorge crossing, but the critique applies generally to all the green
books authors. As with the larger topic of US Army in World War II, further analysis of MacDonald will be
provided in Chapter Two, but it is important to note that MacDonald was a meticulous historian who
authored a valuable volume about the Rhineland Campaign. This thesis will demonstrate the limitations of
his green book volume due to purpose, perspective, and primary source selection in order to show that the
author’s work should be supplemented with additional analysis.

4

Before exploring the topic further, valuable context must be provided for the
Rhine Gorge crossing. A short explanation of unit sizes, along with a summary of the 89th
ID history and an overview of the Rhineland Campaign will ground the Rhine Gorge
crossing within its historical context. After that, an analysis of the original narrative of
World War II as well as the idealistic revisions and mythological story telling traditions
will provide insight into its historiography. Next, a review of how the World War II
narrative has impacted subsequent policy decisions will substantiate its enduring
relevance. Finally, chapter previews will outline how a variety of perspectives and
sources can be used to better understand the Rhine Gorge crossing as well as the
implications of refining and retelling that specific piece of history.
To properly understand the scale of the operations conducted on March 26, 1945,
it is helpful to review the echelons of army units and their approximate size. American
divisions such as the 89th ID were typically made up of 10,000-15,000 soldiers. The 89th
ID was subdivided into regiments. In addition to the special troops and enablers such as
field artillery and engineers, the 89th ID consisted of three infantry regiments, the 353rd
Infantry Regiment (353rd IN), the 354th IN and the 355th IN, each consisting of about
2,500 soldiers. In turn, each of those regiments was divided into three battalions,
numbered one through three, and consisting of about 700 soldiers each. The battalions
contained three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company, each with 150 soldiers,
for a total of four maneuver companies per battalion. The company names were letters,
beginning with “A” and continuing in order across the regiment through “L.” Therefore,
“A Company” (A Co) through “D Company” (D Co) belonged to the 1st Battalion (1st
BN). Similarly, E Co through H Co belonged to 2nd BN, and I Co through L Co belonged

5

to 3rd BN. Rifle companies typically consisted of three rifle platoons (about 35 soldiers),
and a weapons platoon with machine guns. Rifle platoons contained three squads (10
soldiers). Above the division level were corps (25,000-50,000), army (100,000-150,000)
and army group (wide variance in size).
As is evidenced by the organization of American army units, the number three
was important in the tactical approach of the United States. There were three maneuver
regiments in each division, three maneuver battalions in each regiment, three rifle
companies in each battalion, three rifle platoons in each rifle company, and three squads
in each rifle platoon. Typically, units would fight with two elements forward and one
element in reserve. On March 26, the 89th ID was tasked with crossing the Rhine River
between the towns of Kestert and Kaub, a 16.7km stretch of what is known as the Rhine
Gorge. In order to accomplish their mission, the 89th ID separated their sector into two
smaller sections, assigning the 353rd IN to the southern section and the 354th IN to the
northern section, with the 355th IN held in reserve.9 The 353rd IN chose to cross at
Oberwesel, encountering relatively light resistance. The 354th IN crossed in the northern
sector at two locations, with 2-354th at St Goarshausen and 1-354th IN 2.3km north at
Wellmich as 3-354th IN was held back as the regimental reserve.10 Finally, G Co served
as the battalion reserve for 2-354th IN, and B Co served as the battalion reserve for 1354th IN.11 The practice of holding units in reserve meant that although an entire division
was assigned a seemingly small section of the river to cross, only four companies would
face the brunt of the German defenses at Wellmich and St Goarshausen, as is clearly

9

89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 201.
James Wilson, Combat History of the 354th Infantry Regiment, 1945 (Colorado Springs: 354th Infantry
Regiment Society, 1985), 13.
11
Wilson, Combat History of the 354th Infantry Regiment, 27.
10
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illustrated in Figure Two with the highlighted companies representing the force initially
tasked with crossing in the most dangerous sector—roughly 600 soldiers. The size of the

Figure Two: 89th ID Task Organization for Rhine Crossing
American force making the initial crossing is important because it contextualizes the
casualties suffered. In a war where millions of soldiers and civilians died, hundreds of
casualties can seem relatively inconsequential. But hundreds of casualties suffered by a
group so small is devastating.
The section of river assigned to the 89th ID had both strategic and symbolic
significance, which contributed to the risk. In his memoirs, Lieutenant General (LTG)
George Patton said very little about the crossing of the 89th ID—he even attributed the
crossing to the 76th ID, the unit the 89th ID passed through before they crossed the Rhine
Gorge. However, he did make a specific note about the significance of the location. “It
was rather prophetic, I thought, that we should cross at St Goar, near the legendary site of
7

the Lorelai12—one of the sacred spots of German mythology.”13 In The German
Quarterly, Ignace Feuerlicht traces the history of the Lorelei legend back to the early 16th
century.14 The legend surrounds a prominent rock which soars above the cliffs of the
Rhine Gorge south of St Goarshausen where Lorelei, a nymph, would supposedly sit,
distracting sailors and causing them to crash into the treacherous cliffs lining that section
of the river.15 The Rhine Gorge is a long section of the southern Rhine River,
characterized by steep banks leading up to towering ridges. The water flows quickly in
the Rhine Gorge, especially during the spring when the ice melt flows down from the
Alps. Although there is not a nymph sitting on Lorelei rock causing accidents, the area

Figure Three: Rhine Gorge Near St Goarshausen16
12

Several spellings exist including “Lorelai,” Lorelay,” and “Loreley.” The most common spelling,
“Lorelei,” will be used unless it is part of a quotation containing the alternate spelling.
13
George S. Patton, Jr, War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 274.
14
Ignace Feuerlicht, “Heine's ‘Lorelei’: Legend, Literature, Life,” The German Quarterly vol. 53, no. 1
(Jan. 1980): 82.
15
Feuerlicht, “Heine's ‘Lorelei,’ 90.
16
“Rhine River Gorge from Loreley Rock Germany,” Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/b/b1/Rhine_River_Gorge_from_Loreley_Rock_Germany.JPG.
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around St Goarshausen is still the scene of boating accidents, as merchant and tourist
vessels navigate that difficult stretch of river.17 All of the soldiers who participated in the
Rhine Gorge crossing mention the speed of the current. Friedensohn says, “The river was
much too powerful. Trying as hard as we could, utilizing all our strength, we could not
alter the downstream course.”18 Even a cursory overview of the countryside, as is
provided by Figure Three, illustrates the challenges presented by the Rhine Gorge. In
terms of terrain, the 89th ID was assigned one of the toughest sections of the Rhine River
to cross.
At the time of the Rhine Gorge crossing, the 89th ID was one of the most highly
trained organizations in the United States Army, even though they lacked extensive
combat experience. Therefore, the mistakes made during their crossing cannot be
dismissed as the natural result of unprepared troops and leaders facing combat for the
first time. The 89th ID was originally formed during World War I but was immediately
deactivated when the war ended. On July 15, 1942, it was reactivated at Camp Carson,
Colorado, and began to prepare for combat.19 For over a year, the 89th ID continued to
build combat power at Camp Carson, going through multiple training exercises until
November of 1943 when the entire division travelled across the country to participate in
the Louisiana Maneuvers, a large-scale exercise involving multiple divisions.20 The
Louisiana Maneuvers were part of a series of exercises ordered by General (GEN)
George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, to prepare the army for World War II. GEN

17

Mark Landler, “O Lorelei, Your Rhine Is a Beauty, and Still Treacherous,” The New York Times (27 Oct,
2003), A4; “Acid Ship Overturns Near Rhine's Lorelei Rock,” The Australian (14 Jan, 2011), 11.
18
Friedensohn, “Red Ran the Rhine,” 39.
19
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 30.
20
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 52.
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Marshall witnessed the struggles of American forces during World War I and strove to
better prepare for war in the 1940s.21
After spending three months training in Louisiana, the 89th ID travelled directly to
Hunter Liggett Military Reservation in California for another series of maneuvers and
training exercises in January of 1944.22 Those exercises lasted until the end of May,
1944, when the division moved to Camp Butner, North Carolina, for yet another iteration
of training.23 With the move to North Carolina, the 89th ID was reorganized from a light
infantry division to a standard infantry division, which meant thousands of new soldiers
were transferred into the unit. In order to effectively incorporate those new soldiers, the
division created and ran an infantry basic course for new arrivals as well as one of the
first ever Expert Infantryman Badge Testing Boards to reinforce individual soldier
skills.24 As a result of both large-scale maneuvers and intense individual soldier training,
the 89th ID was thoroughly prepared for combat.
It was not until December of 1944 that the 89th ID began movement overseas to
fight in the European Theater.25 With extensive training spanning over two years in four
different regions of the country, the 89th ID was one of the most highly trained units of
World War II, even though they did not see combat until the final months of the war in
1945. The 89th ID was not unprepared when they were ordered to cross the Rhine Gorge.
They had just as much or more training than any other division in the United States Army

21
Mary Kathryn Barbier, “George C. Marshall and the 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers,” Louisiana History:
The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association vol. 44, no.4 (Autumn 2003): 389-390.
22
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 57.
23
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 62.
24
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 65-66.
25
89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 74.
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and were fully manned and equipped for the mission. Therefore, any explanation for the
trouble they experienced during the crossing must look deeper than ill-preparedness.
To understand why the 89th ID found themselves on the bank of the Rhine Gorge
in 1945, it is helpful to review the operational context of World War II. In broad terms,
American involvement in the war can be divided into theaters and subdivided into
campaigns. The Pacific Theater was primarily fought by the Marines and Navy with
small army contingents using the strategy of island hopping, or capturing key logistical
outposts across the Pacific Ocean, to defeat Japan. In the Mediterranean Theater the
United States Army first focused its attention on the Libya Campaign before moving
across North Africa and into Italy via the island of Sicily. Although the Mediterranean
Theater was a series of campaigns that continued until the end of the war, the European
Theater became the primary focus of the United States Army in the summer of 1944 with
D-Day and the Normandy Campaign. After moving across France, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, the army pushed into Germany itself in what is now known as the Rhineland
Campaign.
The greatest obstacle for the Allies during the Rhineland Campaign was crossing
the Rhine River, a feat first successfully undertaken when the US First Army found and
exploited a bridge the Germans failed to destroy at Remagen. The seizure of the
Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen is well known as the decisive point for the Rhineland
Campaign. The government widely publicized the actions of the First Army and as a
result, that event captured the attention of the American public. MacDonald explains in
the Rhineland Campaign green book, “The capture of the Ludendorff railroad bridge and
its subsequent exploitation was one of those coups de theatre that sometimes happen in

11

warfare and never fail to capture the imagination.”26 Because the crossing at Remagen
dominated the narrative, other crossings have largely been ignored. One of those
overlooked crossings is the one conducted by the 89th ID, part of LTG Patton’s Third
Army, in the Rhine Gorge.
Immediately following the conclusion of World War II, the Center of Military
History began working on its thorough operational analysis of the war. The resulting
green books, including MacDonald’s The Last Offensive, were so detailed that they
discouraged further historical analysis of World War II operations. Ronald Spector, a
military historian, describes the uniqueness of World War II history. Usually military
histories focus on operations and tactics, but those aspects of World War II, “had been
covered so thoroughly in the official volumes that relatively few authors attempted to
produce original accounts.” Furthermore, Spector argues that the histories produced by
non-military scholars rely heavily on the green books for operational analysis.27 Even
though it took decades for the series to be completed, volumes were released consistently
following the war and dominated the historical record of tactics and operations in World
War II.28

26

MacDonald, Last Offensive, 234.
Ronald Spector, “Public History and Research in Military History: What Difference Has It Made?” The
History Teacher vol. 26, no. 1 (Nov. 1992): 92.
28
Although The Last Offensive by MacDonald was not published until 1973, there were not any noteworthy
attempts to create a comprehensive history of the Rhineland Campaign prior to its publication. That may
have been due to the consistent release of green books beginning in the late 1940s. It was widely known
that the topic would eventually be covered by the Center of Military History, and there was apparently no
appetite for such a work outside of that institution. The only significant historical works addressing the
Rhineland Campaign prior to MacDonald’s publication were the memoirs of American generals and the
division history, both of which MacDonald cited in his book. It may seem like an outlier due to the late
publication, but the overarching consistency between preserved army records, officer memoirs, and
MacDonald’s book justify grouping them together within the original narrative. Their consistency likely
results from the fact that each author served in the United States Army during World War II, including
MacDonald himself.
27
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Likely due to the amount of time it took to complete the green books, the
historical boards for specific units produced histories that were endorsed and printed by
the United States Army.29 The 89th ID published their own history, but it was consistent
with the subsequently published narrative of The Last Offensive, providing more details
about that specific division. Although the official histories are well researched and
meticulously written using army reports and leader accounts, they do not question the
tactical and operational decisions leading up to the crossing of the Rhine Gorge. While
they do mention the casualties and struggles incurred during the crossing, their message
is a clear affirmation of the US military’s initial conclusion that the operation was an
unmitigated success. These early published histories form the foundation of what could
be described as the original narrative of World War II.
The original narrative typically promotes the idea of American exceptionalism,
especially in its treatment of American fighting forces. For example, MacDonald
structures his volume to present the United States military as the greatest fighting force in
modern warfare. In his review of The Last Offensive, historian Edward Parsons
comments, “A comforting notion pervades MacDonald's story: America's casualties were
usually minimized by the competence of Eisenhower's officers.”30 In order to maintain
that comforting notion, mistakes made by American officers in places like the Rhine
Gorge are minimized or entirely ignored. Since many of those histories were produced by
organizations such as the Center of Military History, their emphasis on American
29

Almost all the World War II divisional series books were published by the Infantry Journal Press in
Washington DC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Stone and Stone, an online database for World War II
books lists over thirty books in the series. A list of the titles can be found at
http://books.stonebooks.com/publisher/2641/.
30
Edward B. Parsons, “Reviewed Work: United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of
Operations: The Last Offensive by Charles B. MacDonald,” The Journal of American History vol. 61, no. 4
(Mar. 1975): 1145.
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exceptionalism following World War II and in the midst of intense foreign conflicts
should be viewed as unavoidable contextual grounding rather than a flawed historical
approach.
In addition to the historical accounts commissioned and published by elements of
the US government, another crucial element within the original World War II narrative is
the collaboration that occurred between the United States Army, specific army leaders,
and the media. This collaboration forms the foundation of primary sources on which the
official histories rest. As military historian Peter Mansoor highlights, “The guns had
hardly cooled after the Allied victory over Germany in World War II when both
participants and historians began the debate over the relative merits of the armies that
fought the war.”31 Although the army published its own history, there were also several
leaders who attempted to influence the narrative and justify their own decisions by
publishing personal accounts of the war. GEN Dwight Eisenhower and GEN Omar
Bradley both wrote autobiographies focusing on the war years.32 LTG Patton died at the
end of the war, but his detailed notes were consolidated into a posthumous account.33
Also, one of LTG Patton’s staff officers wrote a book about the Third Army which

31

Peter R. Mansoor, “Building Blocks of Victory: American Infantry Divisions in the War Against
Germany and Italy, 1941-1945,” PhD Diss. (The Ohio State University, 1995), 1. Mansoor’s dissertation
was later adapted and published as a monograph. The above quotation did not survive the adaptation, but
Mansoor’s argument remained the same. Specifically, he argued that the US Army displayed a higher level
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basically echoed Patton’s opinions.34 All of these officers were strategically involved in
the decision to cross the Rhine Gorge, and their early analysis of the Rhineland
Campaign enabled them to maintain a level of control over the narrative and avoid
detailed critical analysis of their decisions, especially since their accounts are generally
consistent with official histories. Finally, the American media served as little more than a
mouthpiece for the United States Army during World War II. As historian Steven Casey
asserts, the reporters told “a story that both the military and the home front wanted to
hear.”35 Journalists were strategically placed, and their stories were monitored to ensure
that they echoed the official story.
Because the original narrative consisting of official histories, leader memoirs, and
flattering media coverage intentionally glosses over the crossing of the Rhine Gorge,
there is not as much historiographical context for that specific event when compared to
other World War II topics—it has been largely forgotten. But this dearth does not
preclude contributions by later historians. Unfortunately, the complexity of World War II,
the immense range of subtopics, and the diversity of opinions make it difficult to
generalize the historiography. Furthermore, there is significantly less historiographical
analysis of World War II than would be expected considering the immense amount of
research that has been conducted on the topic.
The only comprehensive work on World War II historiography that exists is
World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with General Sources: A Handbook of
Literature and Research. Edited by Loyd Lee and published in 1997, it attempts to
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document the most important academic works covering prominent themes discussed
since the conclusion of the war. Recognizing the need for his project, Lee writes, “There
is, surprisingly, no comprehensive historiographic survey of the Second World War.”36
One likely reason for the lack of historiographical summaries on World War II is that the
original narrative firmly grounds the historical discussion, resulting in less drastic
interpretive deviations than other conflicts and historical subjects have seen. Supporting
that theory, Donald Schilling notes in his chapter within Lee’s volume, “the war as
defined and depicted in the late 1940s and early 1950s has remained strikingly consistent
over the decades.”37 While much has been written about World War II, many of the
original themes and arguments have remained unchallenged, especially at the tactical and
operational levels. The endurance of original themes such as American exceptionalism,
even in seemingly apolitical narratives, has had a profound impact.
The effect of a World War II narrative promoting American exceptionalism has
been outlined by several scholars. Steven Hook and John Spanier argue in their textbook,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II, that America’s global foreign policy since
becoming a world power has been based entirely on a national identity defined by the
country’s interpretation of World War II.38 As they succinctly put it, “The era of
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American primacy began amid the ashes of World War II.”39 More than just a reaction to
objective facts about the war, America’s foreign policy has been inextricably linked with
a specific interpretation of the war. Historian Jeremy Black asserts that “the domestic
politics of the war led into the politics of the memory of the war.” Furthermore, Black
argues that the fight to control the narrative and resulting political ramifications of that
narrative have essentially been a continuation of the war.40 A cursory look at United
States foreign policy following World War II reveals an aggressive attempt to control
global events, including armed conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Adjusting the World War II narrative would not necessarily change foreign policy, but
the original narrative is undeniably linked to the actions of the United States following
the war.
In addition to foreign policy, the original war narrative has had a profound and
ongoing impact on the military. Modern military scholars often view World War II as the
blueprint for successful military operations. In his book Anatomy of Victory, strategist
John Caldwell refers to World War II as “the benchmark for a victorious national
commitment.”41 His entire argument revolves around the idea that World War II was an
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unmitigated success. He believes that a deep understanding of why American forces
succeeded provides the key to duplicating that success in future conflicts. Asserting
“there has never been any doubt in any informed mind,” Caldwell never considers the
possibility that the narrative of unmitigated American success could have been at least
partially manufactured by the media, the military, and early historians.42 Similarly,
historian Thomas Ricks argues that the World War II model of officer management
should be implemented today because it was the last successful war the United States
fought. Interestingly, Ricks notes that the modern American military in many ways
remains within the mold created by GEN Marshall. For Ricks that must be emulated in
more ways to enable future success.43 Overall, military strategists constantly hearken
back to World War II for inspiration. While there is a place for learning from the past,
few discuss the extent to which the World War II narrative was tailored to support the
case for American exceptionalism and expand global influence.
Although the historiography has been surprisingly consistent, there are two
important trends that represent divergences from the original narrative. First, in the
decades following World War II, cracks in the official story began to form as scholars
questioned controversial policies such as carpet bombing, the censorship of the media,
the treatment of Japanese Americans, and the use of nuclear weapons. In 1957, Louis
Morton noted for the journal Foreign Affairs that criticism of the decision to use nuclear
weapons began soon after the war concluded.44 Once they began, the critiques did not
cease. For example, in 2005, Thomas Childers questioned the excessive violence
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perpetrated against German civilians through bombing campaigns for the journal Central
European History.45 Similarly, critiques concerning the effect of the war on the United
States span the decades from the conclusion of the war until today.46 The one
commonality that unites all of these critiques is that they attempt to revise the original
narrative for ideological purposes, focusing almost entirely on strategic level decisions at
the highest echelons of national leadership. Of note, these ideological divergences
represent the bulk of scholarly revisionism for World War II. Specifically, the academic
community has focused almost exclusively on ideological issues stemming from the war
without delving into combat operations and the tactical decisions of American soldiers
and leaders.
Conversely, in the decades that followed the war, other historians, authors, and
media personalities began to focus on the individual soldier’s experience during World
War II, producing an interesting and unique glorification of the war. President Ronald
Reagan’s speech at Normandy commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day is an
excellent example of that glorification, but the trend began long before Reagan and can
be seen in the books of popular author Cornelius Ryan who was willing to question
certain aspects of the original war narrative in order to honor individual soldiers who
participated. More than one of Ryan’s books were adapted into popular films. Several
scholars in the past two decades have noticed the glorification trend, pointing to the
books of Stephen Ambrose, Hollywood movies such as Saving Private Ryan, and even
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video games such as Call of Duty.47 While the intent is often honorable, the glorification
of heroic actions tends toward mythological story telling produced for popular
consumption within the United States rather than critical scholarly analysis.
Overall, the willingness of some historians to question the perceptions and
cultural memories of World War II, regardless of their motivation, has provided a
foundation for amending the original narrative. World War II history has been
consistently altered to support ideological arguments and capitalized on to promote
nationalistic feelings. The ideological revisions and mythological retellings have
developed alongside each other, informing very different perspectives and conclusions
about the significance of World War II. Since they were typically produced for different
audiences, they have also resulted in a significant gap between popular history and
academic history. Both traditions have limitations, but they provide the precedence for
further analysis of the subject. Specifically, ideological revisions have opened the door
for harsh criticism of American leaders when it is justified, while mythologizing popular
histories have placed an emphasis on the accounts of individual soldiers whose stories
often diverge from the official histories embodied most prominently in the green books.
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Implementing methodologies from both traditions, it is possible to shift focus
away from the strategic political decisions and toward the tactical decisions of American
military leaders in World War II. Although historians have critiqued and revised much of
the war narrative, it is still extremely rare for scholars to question the original tactical and
operational narrative. Ironically, reexamining this aspect of the narrative can result in
refined perspectives on the strategic and political ramifications of the war. In order to
refine the tactical and operational narrative, it is necessary to examine, compare, and
contrast the following perspectives of the Rhine Gorge crossings: the American media,
the United States Army, US Army General Officers, the German defenders, and
participating American soldiers. Understanding what happened during a battle is
challenging, but comparing perspectives and balancing discrepancies creates a clearer
picture. The most daunting aspect is compiling and analyzing the accounts of veterans.
While there are several sources available, thought must be given to the location of each
person on the battlefield to make difficult judgments concerning their credibility. Some
wrote decades after the conclusion of World War II. Others present seemingly inaccurate
details that must be carefully examined to determine reliability. By narrowly focusing on
a specific event, it is possible to widen the search for sources and incorporate a large
variety of perspectives, enabling an informed critique of the original narrative.
The media is a logical starting point for understanding the American memory of
World War II since they formed the initial picture most Americans had of the war.
Chapter One focuses on newspaper articles, newsreels, and radio broadcasts produced
during the war, citing primary sources but also leveraging research on how the media
created its narrative. The media did not really cover the Rhine Gorge crossing, in part
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because they were censored to prevent reporting that would portray the United States
military negatively, yet simultaneously they were also willing promoters of American
exceptionalism. Lack of coverage for the Rhine Gorge crossing is significant because the
media typically covered the war effort in detail.
Building on the influence of the media, Chapter Two discusses how the United
States Army meticulously preserved written records and created histories including the
overarching US Army in World War II, which draws heavily from After Action Reports.
All these documents demonstrate how the military interpreted and understood the events
of World War II. Official histories and army reports do not portray the Rhine Gorge
crossing as a flawed operation because each author had a vested interest in promoting
American exceptionalism. Fundamentally, they were the Americans that were
exceptional, so favorable estimations of their own efforts should be expected. The unit
reports were written by officers intimately involved in the planning, and the histories are
still a product of the same over-arching organization even if they are somewhat removed
from that specific battle.
Behind both the media portrayal and the official histories there were intelligent
leaders working diligently to understand, craft, and control the narrative of World War II.
No matter what their motivations may have been, the autobiographies and biographies of
key World War II generals indicate how they perceived the war both strategically and
operationally. Army senior leaders were close enough to the Rhine Gorge crossing to
know it was flawed, but far enough removed that they did not have to justify it in detail.
They provide varying levels of positive interpretation while simultaneously distancing
themselves from mistakes without even acknowledging them as such. Each general was a
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strong proponent of American exceptionalism, often supporting that narrative in a selfserving manner. Chapter Three compares the works of senior leaders to the official army
records and the media reports to show how they complement each other, forming a
generally unified original narrative.
Although often overlooked, the reports of German defenders provide a great deal
of insight into the accuracy of US Army conclusions about the enemy they were facing.
Chapter Four examines the German military records preserved following the war in
archives by the United States, providing interesting counterpoints to the narrative
produced by American leaders. Thorough analysis of the forces defending the Rhine
Gorge absent American interpretation leads to more accurate conclusions about
reasonable outcomes—it reframes the cost in terms of lives lost compared to how many
casualties could be expected against a weakened defensive force. The German leaders
had no desire to promote American exceptionalism, and their accounts open the door for
a more critical interpretation of American tactics.
While the German perspective is invaluable, the most important perspective for
re-examining the crossings of the Rhine Gorge is that of the soldiers who participated.
Admittedly, the accounts of American soldiers are the most unreliable and contradictory
sources available, but they are also the only surviving eye-witness records. Their stories
must be balanced against each other and the unit reports since the intensity of combat can
lead to distorted memories. Despite the interpretive challenges, they would have been less
inclined to conform their stories to a larger narrative, and several previously
unrecognized trends can be gleaned from their accounts. Acknowledging the human
proclivity to sensationalize, they still convincingly prove that significant tactical errors
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were made by the United States Army. Having already examined the other perspectives,
Chapter Five highlights the perspectives of American soldiers who crossed the Rhine
Gorge and puts all those perspectives in conversation, specifying the four fundamental
mistakes made by American leaders: poor crossing site selection, unnecessarily rushed
operational tempo, the inappropriate use of a surprise attack, and an insufficiently
coordinated combined arms operation.
Comparing a wide variety of sources and perspectives demonstrates that the
virtually unquestioned original narrative of the Rhine Gorge produced by the Center of
Military History and related sources does not adequately incorporate the perspective of
the soldiers who conducted the crossings or the German defenders. Furthermore, the
original narrative also inadequately discusses the mistakes made by American military
leaders in order to reinforce American exceptionalism. The details surrounding the
tactical decisions of the 89th ID and how history treats them may seem relatively
insignificant—the outcome of World War II did not rest on the success or failure of their
mission at the Rhine Gorge. However, if those tactical decisions have been
misrepresented, it leads one to question what other tactical decisions have been
misrepresented. The original World War II narrative impacts more than just that specific
story. The history of World War II looms large in the development of American military
doctrine, the crafting of foreign policy, and overarching conceptualizations of America’s
place in World History. The process of refining the history of the Rhine Gorge crossing
could serve as a model for further refinement and the development of new World War II
interpretations as a whole; in turn, revising the World War II narrative could impact how
other conflicts are understood.
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CHAPTER ONE
MEDIA PORTRAYAL OF THE WAR
Since such stories might reveal information on conditions within the
Army which might prove valuable to the enemy, the utmost caution
was necessary in censorship of copy.
—201st Field Press Censorship Organization48

Following the crossing of the Rhine Gorge by the 89th ID, no newsreels heralded
their actions. There is no record of detailed radio reports about the struggle at St
Goarshausen. Newspapers buried the events of March 26, 1945, in generalized war
reports with little or no mention of the American lives lost. But what does the lack of
reporting say about the Rhine Gorge crossing? Why did the media ignore what
happened? There are two fundamental reasons. First, the United States government
censored the media, using coercion to control their message. Second, and more
importantly, the media willingly promoted the idea of American exceptionalism, fully
endorsing the priorities of the military and government. The American media propagated
a narrative that minimized the mistakes of the United States military and highlighted
successes, becoming little more than a mouthpiece as the United States government
controlled their reports using both coercion and cooperation.
Unlike the Rhineland Campaign and the crossing of the Rhine Gorge, the topic of
government censorship during World War II has captured the imagination of the
American academic community, resulting in a robust body of research on the topic.
Examining the topics of censorship and freedom of the press from almost every
imaginable angle, serious historical monographs have been written consistently since the
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1960s, with spikes in the 1970s due to the Vietnam War and the early 1990s due to
changing perspectives after the conclusion of the Cold War.49 While much has been
written, the most thorough examination of how the United States government conducted
its censorship during World War II is media historian Michael Sweeney’s book, Secrets
of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War
II.50 The work of Sweeney and the historians who preceded him can be used to provide
valuable context for a thorough analysis of newspaper articles, radio reports, and
newsreels. Their conclusions can then be applied to the crossing of the Rhine Gorge and
leveraged to understand why the lack of coverage is so significant.
During World War II, to prevent enemies from collecting intelligence from the
media, the United States developed a robust censorship program that originated from
World War I censorship policies. James Mock, a historian of the mid-20th century, states
in his analysis of World War II policy that, “Anyone who has examined in detail
America’s censorship activities in World War I will understand why there must be limits
to censorship in a democracy, even in war time.”51 Mock and his colleagues analyzed
President Roosevelt’s policies in real time, participating in a symposium in 1942,
discussing censorship policy. They brought a historical perspective to the discussion,
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using the extreme policies of World War I to characterize the administration as relatively
restrained and liberal. Although World War II censorship was relatively light, it was
fundamentally based on World War I policy, meaning that it still strictly controlled the
flow of information.
At the beginning of American involvement in World War I, the face of
government censorship was George Creel, the director of the Committee on Public
Information.52 Creel enforced laws like the Espionage Act of 1917, which provided the
government with the ability to prosecute individuals spreading dangerous information.
The language of the Espionage Act was broad, and the law allowed for significant fines
as well as imprisonment for up to twenty years.53 The Espionage Act was quickly
followed by the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918,
further expanding the ability of the government to control the media.54 While the
excesses of censorship during World War I informed World War II policy reforms, they
also provided a precedent for government control over the media.
At the outbreak of World War II, President Roosevelt said, “It is necessary that
prohibitions against the domestic publication of some types of information, contained in
long-existing statutes, be rigidly enforced.”55 In his analysis of war time control over the
press, Daniel Smyth argues that President Roosevelt was likely referring to the elements
of World War I censorship legislation that were still on the books in 1941.56 While
contemporary scholars like Mock may have characterized Roosevelt’s censorship policies
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as relatively light, the president clearly remained entrenched in the controlling and
cautious mindset of World War I policymakers. Sweeney notes that President Roosevelt
was skeptical of the press and not particularly concerned with preserving their civil
liberties.57 However, President Roosevelt did see the media as an important tool for
promoting the war effort, even if he did not trust them.
In order to curb their excesses as well as tap into their potential for constructing a
positive narrative, President Roosevelt created both the Office of Censorship and the
Office of War Information.58 Byron Price directed the Office of Censorship, providing
guidelines for the media regarding information that should be excluded from their
publications. Although the administration was ready to provide Price with unparalleled
legal authority to censor the American media, he idealistically chose to initiate a system
of voluntary self-censorship instead.59 Voluntary participation was enabled by the
exceptional patriotism amongst the citizens and organizations of the United States due to
the aggression of Japan and Germany. However, it should also be noted that the
willingness of the administration to implement harsher forms of censorship contributed to
the media’s active participation in self-censorship.60
Conversely, the Office of War Information, led by Elmer Davis, acted as a news
source for American publications, pushing a government-approved narrative to the
media.61 The idealistic Price did not approve of the “salesman” approach of the Office of
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War Information, leading him to resist President Roosevelt’s attempts to merge the two
offices.62 Although Price was not comfortable with the Office of War Information, they
did not typically achieve their means using an authoritarian approach, but rather co-opted
the media by providing additional access to information in order to maintain control of
the story. Kevin Brogan argues in his dissertation on defense policy that the media and
the military had a mutual respect, allowing the Office of War Information to operate
behind the scenes without implementing active control measures.63 However, once
reporters entered a war zone during World War II, the contents of their reports were not
controlled by either of the two government offices. Instead, the theater commanders had
complete control over the access granted to reporters and war correspondents.
Additionally, all news leaving the theater had to be reviewed and approved by the
military, providing commanders with an unprecedented ability to control the news sent
back to the United States for public consumption.64
Overall, the United States government undoubtedly fostered a spirit of
cooperation with the media, enabling immense control over how the war story was told,
and the media was complicit as they sought to support the war effort. As Sweeney says,
“Journalists were part of the team.”65 Additionally, the heavy-handed actions of the
government during World War I and the insistence of the Roosevelt administration on
media control created a passive environment of coercion. It was understood that
violations of self-censorship would not be tolerated, and anything that could be construed
as a lack support for the United States would invite serious consequences. Therefore, the
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government used both cooperation and coercion to control the narrative communicated
by the media.
The level of control exercised by the government over the media fluctuated by
media type. During World War II the media took three primary forms: print, radio, and
newsreels. Generally, the print media was able to get closer to the front lines, but they
were dependent on commanders for their access and their reports were vetted by the
military prior to sending them to the United States. On the other hand, both radio and
newsreels were limited by the technology of the times, making it difficult for them to
keep up with the fast pace of the Allied forces. They often relied on reports coming from
print journalists and information released to them by large Allied headquarters elements.
The three media forms were coerced both actively and passively to varying degrees, and
all of them willingly cooperated to achieve a startling lack of coverage for the Rhine
Gorge crossing considering the steady streams of radio, film, and print reports flowing
from the front lines.
Since the print media war correspondents were closest to the action, they formed
the cornerstone of World War II reporting as they faced enemy fire alongside American
soldiers. The famous reporter, Ernie Pyle, was shot in the head by a Japanese machine
gunner on the island of Ie Shima—he was just one of fifty-four journalists killed during
the war.66 While their bravery cannot be questioned, the historical consensus is that they
provided the American public with an incomplete or overly idealistic version of events as
they unfolded in Europe. In a monograph providing subtle counterpoints to that
consensus, Steven Casey succinctly summarizes the majority view by saying,
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“correspondents packaged news in a palatable form.”67 Ernie Pyle’s biographer, James
Tobin, argues that the American public did not want to read about the horrors of war, but
rather looked for upbeat news about the success of their soldiers. According to Tobin,
correspondents like Pyle provided the people with what they wanted and needed to
hear.68 Tobin’s analysis illustrates the majority view referenced by Casey. Specifically,
Tobin argues that war reporters chose to provide an idealistic portrayal of the war rather
than simply being forced to do so by the government. Writing in the 1970s at the end of
the Vietnam War, Phillip Knightley provides a more cynical interpretation of World War
II reporters, claiming that they allowed themselves to be co-opted by the American war
machine.69 Whether or not Knightley’s cynicism is warranted, he convincingly argues
that excessive government influence on the media can be dangerous.
Although Steven Casey maintains that journalists were more than just
mouthpieces for the government during World War II, the media was unquestionably
influenced by the military. Even Casey admits that the military censored reports and
controlled access to information in order to maintain control over what was being sent
home to the American people. As the Allies crossed the Rhine River, the influence of
American military leaders on the print media fixated reporters on one specific event: the
capture of the Ludendorff Bridge by the 9th Armored Division at Remagen on March 7,
1945. In his autobiography, war reporter Andy Rooney recalls his excitement about being
one of the first reporters on the scene. “The crossing of the Rhine was one of the most
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important events of the war and Howard Cowan and I had it exclusively.”70 But Rooney’s
access to Remagen was no accident. He openly admits that the public-relations officer for
the 9th AD played a crucial role in providing access to reporters.71 In that sense, the
reporters were exactly where the army wanted them to be. Rooney may have been first to
the scene, but within hours there was a frenzied rush of journalists scrambling to cover
the events at Remagen.72 American newspapers were filled with stories about that
important event, and it overshadowed other stories even as subsequent crossings were
conducted.73 The Ludendorff Bridge provided the kind of symbolic, visceral storyline
that made for a great report, and as reporters fixated on Remagen they also fixated the
eyes of the entire nation to Remagen.
Although journalists were overwhelmingly focused on Remagen, GEN
Eisenhower wanted them to highlight one additional story during the Rhine Crossing.
COL Robert Allen, a staff member in GEN Patton’s Third Army, recalls GEN
Eisenhower instructing the Third Army to “Call in the reporters and see that they get the
right kind of stories… They’ll use them and the folks back home will eat them up.”74 The
story GEN Patton provided for reporters was the virtually uncontested crossing of the
Rhine River by the 5th ID at Oppenheim, south of the Rhine Gorge on March 23, 1945.
GEN Patton provided the “scoop” for this crossing to reporter Edward Ball, and the
headline of The New York Times on March 24 read, “PATTON CROSSES RHINE IN A
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DARING DRIVE WITHOUT BARRAGE.” Figure Four illustrates the striking optimism
and support for the military displayed in that specific newspaper edition, and it is
representative of most newspapers at that time. The story by Ball describes the crossing
as “the greatest over-water assault since Normandy.”75 Oppenheim rested upstream of the
Rhine Gorge in a relatively tranquil and lightly defended sector. Patton’s Third Army
would go on to cross the Rhine Gorge in two different sections of the Rhine Gorge—a

Figure Four: The New York Times on March 24, 1945
total of five crossing points executed by the 87th ID and the 89th ID, resulting in
bridgeheads at Boppard (87th ID) and St Goarshausen (89th ID). None of the Rhine Gorge
crossings were featured by Edward Ball or any other reporter. At best they were
mentioned in passing, but they were mostly ignored. Instead, the print media featured the
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crossing at Oppenheim—an uplifting and encouraging story of ambitious leadership
saving American lives.
The New York Times published daily updates on the progress of Allied troops
during World War II, with reporter Drew Middleton writing a detailed column that
tracked the movement of Armies, Corps, and Divisions. Hardly any significant movement
escaped Middleton’s attention, let alone significant battles, which often merited their own
feature pieces. As the Third Army crossed the Rhine Gorge, rather than a front-page
story, the 87th ID and the 89th ID received a passing comment and a parenthetical
addendum, respectively. Middleton writes, “The doughboys pushed over the river
between Koblenz and Boppard at one minute after midnight last night according to
reports from the front.” His underwhelming assessment of the 87th ID’s crossing is
followed by a side note in parenthesis: “A German report said another crossing had been
made between Boppard and St Goarshausen, Reuter reported.”76 The only other mention
of the crossings is buried in the daily official press release from the Allied Expeditionary
Force. On March 26, it states that the Allies crossed near Boppard in assault boats and
“met strong resistance from anti-aircraft guns and dug-in enemy positions.”77 The
following day there was a vague reference to a new Rhine River crossing in the south
executed without air or artillery preparation.78 It is unclear if either or both of those
comments refer to the crossing of the 89th ID, but the complete lack of detail sufficiently

76

Drew Middleton, “Patton Drives East,” The New York Times (26 March, 1945).
“The Texts of the Day’s Communiques on the Fighting in Various War Zones,” The New York Times (27
March, 1945).
78
“The Texts of the Day’s Communiques on the Fighting in Various War Zones,” The New York Times (28
March, 1945).
77

34

buries the story and avoids having to mention the significant loss of American lives in the
Rhine Gorge.
On the other side of the country, The Los Angeles Times also provided updates on
the progress of American troops. Although they typically do not give the same level of
detail, they do mention both the 87th ID and St Goar. The Los Angeles Times article
states, “Along the Rhine, the 87th Division made a new crossing east of Boppard, linked
up with another new bridgehead established at St Goar, and widened the new holding.”79
Once again, the 89th ID is not mentioned by name, even though they faced the brunt of
the German defenses in the Rhine Gorge and sustained the most casualties; also, there is
not even a mention of the difficulties encountered during the crossing. Overall, the
newspapers clearly feature the actions that made better stories and served the war effort
by keeping the morale high back in the United States. Remagen dominated the news, and
Third Army’s crossing at Oppenheim provided an uplifting narrative, but the struggles in
the Rhine Gorge were kept from the attention of the American public.
Print media undoubtedly had the greatest access to frontline news during World
War II and reached a wide audience across the United States; however, the radio was
arguably the most common source of news for Americans. In her dissertation on the
impact of the radio during World War II, Melissa Dinsman asserts that over 90% of
American homes had a radio, and even though newsreels and newspapers dominate the
modern conception of reporting during World War II, the radio served as the primary
news source rather than those other mediums.80 Dinsman goes on to argue that the radio
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had a unique connection with people and was able to affect the thoughts and emotions of
the public in a manner that other forms of media could not. She states that, “more than
written or pictorial images, images created via sound appeal directly and more powerfully
to the listener’s imagination.”81 Stanley Cloud and Lynne Olson make a similar argument
in their monograph on the CBS broadcasters of World War II, stating that the lack of
editors and the immediacy of radio made those journalists some of the most influential
media personalities of the war.82 The ability of radio to quickly reach American homes
and the relative lack of censorship compared to print and film made it an incredibly
influential medium, but it was not without its drawbacks. Although more difficult to
enforce, radio was still subject to the guidelines of the Office of Censorship and the
Office of War Information. Additionally, the nature of the technology created unique
limitations.
Radio broadcasting technology developed dramatically during World War II, but
it could not keep up with the fast pace of an offensive campaign. Broadcasting equipment
could not be slung on a reporter’s back or be moved from one location to another at a
moment’s notice. It took time to disassemble and set up, and transporting it safely was no
small task. Due to these limitations, radio reporters typically set up their operation around
large headquarters that did not move as frequently. The benefit of being near the
campaign headquarters was ready access to centralized information; however, they were
often limited to the official reports given to them by the military.83
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Since radio was less mobile than print, it is necessary to understand where the key
radio reporters were located during the Rhine Gorge crossings. Ed Murrow and his CBS
crew, the preeminent radio reporters of the war, remained in London until March of 1945.
When they decided to move closer to the action, they chose the largest, most complex
mission planned for crossing the Rhine River—the northern crossing by the 21st Army
Group near Wesel, Germany. The Wesel crossing consisted of Operation Plunder using
naval landing craft to cross the Rhine, and Operation Varsity which was one of the largest
airborne operations of the war.84 The 21st Army Group was commanded by the British
Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and consisted of both American and British
soldiers, making it prime material for journalists with the added complexity of
international cooperation in the midst of an already complicated operation.
Due to the forces involved and the type of operations conducted at Wesel, it is not
surprising that it attracted the attention of radio reporters. CBS aired an episode of The
March of Time, a dramatic radio program produced by Time magazine, featuring Bob
Cappa recounting the story of jumping with paratroopers from the 21st Army Group.
Cappa, a reporter and photographer employed by Life magazine, recounts the horror of
seeing a dead paratrooper, but the rest of his story focuses on the success of Allied
troops.85 Even after witnessing war first-hand, Cappa and the CBS radio team continued
to promote the optimistic themes that the military wanted them to feature.
Eric Sevareid, one of the CBS reporters in that sector, provided an in-depth report
on the crossing of Ninth Army, 21st Army Group for the CBS World News Today
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broadcast on April 5, 1945. In his report, he claims that the soldiers were happy in that
sector because the war was going so well. His story is full of overwhelming optimism.86
One of Murrow’s colleagues at CBS, Bill Shadel, reports later in the same broadcast that
their crew remained in the northern sector with 21st Army Group until early April, when
they moved down to the Third Army sector to report on one specific story—the liberation
of the Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald.87 Although they were focused on the
breaking news of concentration camps, by moving to that sector CBS had access to the
story of the Rhine Gorge crossing. After all, it was the 89th ID that liberated Buchenwald,
only a few days after they crossed the Rhine Gorge. If Ed Murrow and the other CBS
radio men heard about the difficulty the 89th ID had recently experienced, they made no
mention of it. The subjects covered by the CBS reporters were important, but they were
also uniformly optimistic and consistent with approved themes. Location had much to do
with CBS initially failing to report on the Rhine Gorge crossing, but even when they had
access to the story, they chose not to mention it. The initial limited access demonstrates a
level of coercion, while the decision to ignore the Rhine Gorge demonstrates blatant
cooperation.
Although CBS was the preeminent news outlet, they were not the only radio
network sending reports from the front. BBC also had reporters following the Allied
advance. They predictably followed the 21st Army Group as well, since they were most
interested in the progress of British soldiers. Stuart McPherson broadcasted a report from
the British bridgehead, focusing on the hustle and bustle at the constructed bridge as

86

Eric Sevaried, “CBS World News Today” (5 April, 1945), audio file accessed via archive.org,
https://archive.org/details/1945RadioNews/1945-04-05-CBS-World-News-Today.mp3.
87
Bill Shadel, “CBS World News Today” (5 April, 1945).

38

soldiers excitedly raced across the Rhine River.88 Echoing McPherson’s report, Wynford
Vaughan-Thomas notes the optimism at the 21st Army Group bridgehead, stating soldiers
could “see the end to it all now.”89 Even though soldiers were still dying, the BBC
reporters accentuated the positive news for their listeners and spoke as if the war had
basically concluded already, with victory inevitable.
In addition to those from CBS and BBC, there were also radio reports from NBC.
During the Rhineland Campaign, they had two reporters sending updates back to the
United States. Along with many of the newspaper reporters, radio man John MacVane
was embedded with First Army at Remagen. He broadcasted the first radio report from
the east side of the Rhine River on March 26—the day the 89th ID crossed the Rhine
further south. MacVane describes his view from a mountaintop near Remagen by saying
“today all is quiet.”90 He proceeds to claim, “only in scattered points… are the Germans
putting up a fight,” noting that “all along the front divisions are reporting resistance light
or nonexistent.”91 MacVane’s words are ironic considering the intensity of the battle
raging in the Rhine Gorge at that very moment of his report.
Ed Hocker, the other NBC radio reporter, was located far to the south with
Seventh Army, part of the 6th Army Group which included French units. He had no
knowledge of what was going on in the Rhine Gorge, speaking primarily of the vast
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numbers of German soldiers in the south.92 While the NBC reporters were closer to the
Rhine Gorge than CBS and the BBC as the crossing occurred, they did not even mention
the difficult struggle faced by the 89th ID.
The commentary provided by James Stevenson, the NBC radio anchor from New
York, provides additional insight into why there were no reports from the Rhine Gorge.
His prepared bulletin about that sector of the river states:
General Patton’s American Third Army on the southern sector of the Western Front has
struck with lighting speed and tremendous power in a drive which has already gained
over 40 miles east of the Rhine. Although there is a news blackout of Patton’s operations,
a glance at the map shows the strategic possibilities of his position.93

On the day that the 89th ID from LTG Patton’s Third Army struggled to cross the Rhine
Gorge, radio reporters and the rest of the media were cut off from access to military
operations in that area and were confined to reporting generalized bulletins prepared for
them by the army. Stevenson goes on to describe “the comparative ease with which the
Allied armies swept across the Rhine.”94 There is no hint in the NBC report on March 26
of setbacks in the Rhine Gorge, and reports from other networks fail to even mention
Third Army, focusing instead on the 21st Army Group in the north and First Army at
Remagen.
While radio was more difficult to censor, the radio reporters were not spread out
evenly across the entire front. They carefully chose their locations based on where they
believed the biggest story could be found. They were also restricted by the military. The
only broadcasters who were able to see the war up close were in northern Germany,
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Remagen, and far to the south as the Allies were crossing the Rhine—nowhere near the
Rhine Gorge and the crossing of the 89th ID. The one exception is the CBS group who
missed the crossing itself but linked in with the 89th ID shortly thereafter.
Based on the preserved radio broadcasts, it is possible that radio reporters were
completely fooled by the military, but knowing that the media typically cooperated with
the military in promoting themes of American exceptionalism it is more likely that they
sculpted reports to support an entirely positive portrayal of Allied efforts along the Rhine
River. Since the military used a news blackout to cut off media access to the Rhine
Gorge, the reporters could not have initially known about the struggles entailed in that
crossing. However, they also did not seem to question the use of black outs. In the sectors
they did cover, their reports where so optimistic they seem unrealistic in hindsight and,
given the chance to retroactively report on the Rhine Gorge crossing, they remained
quiet. Clearly the radio networks shared a level of culpability in shaping a World War II
narrative that overly accentuated the success of the American military.
In addition to print media and radio broadcasts, Americans also received their
news from short films known as newsreels. There were several private film companies
producing newsreels including Universal, Warner Brothers, Paramount, MGM, 20th
Century Fox, and RKO-Pathe. The film companies remembered the strict oversight of the
government during World War I and proactively decided to produce newsreels
supporting the war effort rather than face similar heavy-handed control. Private
Hollywood companies also created the War Activities Committee to provide oversight
for their wartime efforts. Although the Office of War Information eventually took control
of film management, the War Activities Committee worked to maintain autonomy for
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private companies throughout the war.95 The steps Hollywood took to regulate
themselves could have been motivated by patriotic fervor, but they were also concerned
with their profits. Consequently, the films they produced used sensationalism to boost
entertainment value and turn a profit by filling theaters.96
One newsreel that exemplifies their typical sensationalism and overproduction is
the film “Fight for Rome,” part of The News Parade series. Historically, the fight for
Italy was one of the toughest and most costly campaigns of World War II for the United
States. In the film, up tempo marching music accompanies stock footage of explosions
and American troop movements. The commentary oozes with dramatic and sensational
descriptions of American actions. Describing the initial landings, it claims “swarming
ashore in force, they take the German high command completely unawares.” Rather than
questioning American operations or crediting German defenses in areas that saw high
American casualties, the film states, “there is no battle area anywhere where nature is
more closely allied with the enemy than in Italy.” Yet “the battle-hardened Yanks” are
always pressing on heroically toward victory. Describing the Germans, the film claims,
“they blast and burn in a senseless orgy of destruction.”97 While all American media
tended toward sensationalism, the newsreels took it to a whole new level.
Whether motivated by money or patriotism, the newsreels and propaganda films
of the 1940s absolutely sought to further dramatize the war by reinforcing narratives of
good versus evil, placing the United States within a moral conflict absent of complexity
95
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or grey areas. As historian Claudia Springer argues in her analysis of World War II films,
they attempted to manipulate the emotions of their viewers.98 Such manipulation is clear
in films like “Fight for Rome,” where descriptions of exceptional American heroism are
accompanied by dramatic displays of American firepower and motivational music even
though the events being described actually resulted in thousands of American casualties
sustained against significantly outnumbered German defenders. There was nothing to be
gained by the film companies in describing the horrors of Italy as the Americans payed
dearly for their advances. When compared to other newsreels, “Fight for Rome” is not
unique in how it portrayed the war. Nearly every film of that era displays the same level
of overly positive descriptions. In order to communicate their message, newsreels needed
to feature events that supported their narrative, and mistakes made by the United States
military would not have played well to their audiences.
Although there were several companies producing newsreels, they agreed early on
to participate in a rotapool system in which all footage from the front lines was shared
across all the film companies.99 Additionally, all footage had to be reviewed by the Office
of Censorship and the Office of War Information, meaning there was not a significant
difference between films from separate companies.100 Eventually, the Office of War
Information took oversight one step further and began to produce their own newsreels,
titled United News.101 Hours of archived newsreels remain available online and in
archives, but the nature of how they were produced means that a relatively small sample
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can provide an accurate picture of how all newsreels reported a particular event since
they were using the exact same footage.
As the Allies fought their way across the Rhine River in March, the film crews
shot many reels of footage. In early April, the Office of War Information released a
United News short titled “Rhine Barrier Smashed.” The entire film focuses on Operation
Varsity and Operation Plunder with the airborne and amphibious operations of the
combined British and American 21st Army Group in northern Germany. The short
newsreel contains stunning images of planes taking off, hundreds of paratroopers
jumping into combat, and landing craft moving across the Rhine River. Featuring yet
another dramatic musical score typical of the newsreels, the film begins by stating that
Allied forces laid “like great engines poised on the left bank of the Rhine.” It uses epic
language to describe Americans like “the onslaught reached heights of fury never
equaled, even in Normandy.” Concluding with a comforting sentiment for the audience,
the film states “the artisans of victory… are driving the giant blows, speeding the hour
the whole world has awaited for over five bitter years.” 102 There is no nuance in the
newsreel, nor is there any mention of other sections along the Rhine River.
Universal Newsreel provided a Hollywood perspective on the crossing of the
Rhine with the shorts “Allies Drive Across Rhine to Victory” and “Air Army Invades
Germany.” The first film begins with remarkable images from the battle for Cologne
prior to the Rhine crossings. Although the footage features an uncharacteristically high
level of destruction from the urban fighting, the violence portrayed is almost exclusively
one-sided with images of German tanks and positions being destroyed by American
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heavy weapons. The film also features shots of soldiers moving across the Ludendorff
Bridge in Remagen, highlighting the significance of finding and capturing a bridge over
the Rhine River before the Germans could destroy it. The narrator states, “South of
Cologne at Remagen, our troops made one of the most spectacular coups of the war.”
Ironically, the newsreel states that the capture of the bridge “saved a costly crossing by
assault boats.”103 Of course, it does not mention that the same sort of costly crossings
avoided at Remagen were executed in other sectors including the most costly crossing in
the Rhine Gorge.
The second video largely mirrors the United News film, covering the massive
joint operations of the 21st Army Group. In another moment of irony, the newsreel
features a shot of an Allied glider with the question, “is this trip necessary?” etched on
the front of the aircraft. The narrator flippantly states, “This trip is really necessary for
victory,” as if any sentiment of doubt or disillusionment was nothing more than a joke.
While crossing the Rhine River was necessary to defeat Germany, it would have been
difficult to continue disregarding that sentiment in the Rhine Gorge after so many
crossings had already been accomplished elsewhere. The newsreel concludes with
footage of GEN Eisenhower recognizing the 101st Airborne Division for their efforts
during the Battle of the Bulge. The ceremony featured bands, pristine uniforms, soldiers
marching on parade, and even a Hollywood actress—a far cry from the death and
suffering of war.104 The film gives the impression that the struggle of World War II was
already complete as Allied forces rolled unmolested through the heart of Germany.
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None of the newsreels even mention the Rhine Gorge. The news blackout
referenced in radio reports certainly played a significant role in stifling reporting, but the
tone of the films is not compatible with such difficult struggles anyway. Based on the
coverage of Italy, even if the film crews had been granted access, they more than likely
would have distorted the narrative to make it look like an unmitigated success for the
American troops. More than any other medium, newsreels displayed blatant propaganda
rather than careful investigative journalism. Their sensationalistic and overly dramatic
storylines were primarily driven by the need to please audiences. Newspaper and radio
reporters were also censored and co-opted by the military, but they did not rely as heavily
on drawing an audience. Newspapers were readily available and trusted by those in the
public who wanted to know what was happening in the war. Radio reached into homes
across the country. Only newsreels needed to attract people to turn a profit—and to do so
they used sensationalist techniques that Hollywood had perfected by that time.
Overall, the United States government was extremely effective at controlling the
stories provided to the American public by the media. The Office of Censorship kept the
media from publishing information that could hurt the war effort, and the Office of War
Information proactively shaped the narrative for the people on the home front. There
were also specific challenges for reporters trying to cover the advance of the Allies,
including receiving access from the military for specific regions and moving radio or film
equipment across a war zone. Finally, the media had a vested financial interest in
promoting a pro-American narrative to the public. Motivational stories sold newspapers,
attracted listeners, and filled seats in theaters.
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Even though the media was tightly controlled during World War II, there was a
variety of media outlets—so many that it is possible to find record of almost every
significant engagement during World War II. Not much happened without coverage.
Considering the reach of the American media, the near complete lack of coverage for the
crossings of the Rhine Gorge by the 89th ID is significant. It means that it was not the
type of story that would make it through censors, contribute to the war effort, or
financially benefit the media outlets. Why not? It was not just due to the casualties. Other
battles resulted in far more casualties. But those other battles had a significant impact on
the outcome of the war and could be easily characterized as necessary sacrifices in the
effort to defeat an evil enemy. The crossings in the Rhine Gorge, on the other hand, were
harder to characterize as necessary. The Allies had already made it across the Rhine at
multiple locations across the entire Western Front. The media did not want to bring
attention to the fact that so many American lives were lost in a poorly planned operation
that may not have been necessary.
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CHAPTER TWO
OFFICIAL HISTORIES AND ARMY REPORTS
Where previously the U.S. military planner, searching for an important
precedent or an accurate description of how a problem was handled in
the past, was forced to search through masses of retired files and
unofficial literature, so far as World War II is concerned he need turn
only to the green volumes on the shelf of every higher headquarters,
including the White House, and read what happened.
—LTC M.C. Helfers105

Although media coverage of the Rhine Gorge crossing was extremely limited, the
units that participated kept detailed records of the events. The institutional records
provide more details than any other sources and, therefore, form the skeleton of facts
such as dates, times, units involved, battlefield effects, and casualties sustained. The
amount of raw information available is extremely helpful, but rather than providing the
entirety of the story, the army records still represent a relatively narrow perspective—that
of United States Army leaders. None of the people who wrote the initial reports
physically participated in the early contested crossings since they worked in headquarters
sections behind the front lines with each higher echelon located further from the fighting.
Written by people who were not even remotely present, the official histories rely
primarily on the initial reports preserved by the army. Also, the histories and unit records
refrained from portraying the crossing of the Rhine Gorge as a flawed operation because
the authors had a vested interest in promoting the narrative of American exceptionalism.
Consequently, the official military records and histories should be primarily used to
construct the baseline of events and not be regarded as a definitive account absent of
narrative shaping perspectives.
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The army reports and official histories go hand in hand, but they represent two
different types of sources. The army reports are primarily After Action Reports (AARs)
which were written by every unit from the battalion level all the way to corps and army,
covering all actions conducted during a given period. Written reports, or summaries of
actions, have always been a hallmark of the United States Army, and during World War
II they took the form of typed, succinct reports that would cover no more than a month
with at least a short entry for each day. Typically completed shortly after the events they
described, the unbound reports would be sent to higher headquarters as a comparatively
thorough follow-up to any quick reports sent during the battle via radio or runner. An
example of an AAR can be seen in Figure Five, illustrating how some days were
summarized with a short sentence while others included more detail. Written by staff

Figure Five: Selection from the 354th IN AAR for March, 1945
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officers such as the adjutant or assistant operations officer and endorsed by the unit
commander, they were exclusively a product of headquarters elements and represented
the perspective of the commander. Their content was usually limited to the official orders
produced by the staff, the incomplete reports that made it back to headquarters during the
battle, and the assessments of subordinate commanders after the fight concluded. Not all
the AARs survived the war, but the ones that did were preserved on microfilm by the
National Archives, making them invaluable primary sources.
Official histories are books that were written under the authority of the United
States military and published as an official historical record by the government. They rely
heavily on AARs but represent a legitimate attempt to consolidate primary sources into
cohesive narratives, or histories. While the military has long valued the preservation of
history, the Center of Military History took the lead role in history production following
the war—a role that endured through subsequent conflicts. Responsible for consolidating
the stacks of records like AARs into narrative form, the Center of Military History has
provided a valuable service by producing books that translate the raw historical data into
history. Like other Army publications, each volume is given a number. For instance, The
Last Offensive, which covers the Rhineland Campaign, is CMH Pub 7-9-1. In that sense,
the books are best understood as a middle ground between army field manuals and
history textbooks.
Unit histories are slightly different, because they were produced by individual
units soon after the war before being published by the army. Therefore, unit histories
were written by whoever the commander of that specific unit deemed fit. Based almost
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entirely on unit records and featuring dozens of pictures, the unit histories are comparable
to a well written school yearbook that cites sources.
The starting point for examining army records and official histories must be
United States Army in World War II, which provides broad analysis of the Rhineland
Campaign. Even though the volume relevant to this discussion was not completed until
1973, it was designed to be both the first and last official word, produced by the
organization responsible for codifying the historical record. These green books stand at
the forefront of the official army narrative, so analysis must begin with them. Narrowing
the topic, The 89th Infantry Division: 1942-1945 provides an in-depth look at that
particular division, to include the Rhine Gorge crossing. Produced separately from United
States Army in World War II, the division history is distinct yet complementary and is
cited by United States Army in World War II. Comparing these two official histories with
the AARs from units involved in the Rhine Gorge crossing can help explain how
different echelons and types of units interpreted the battle. Together, all these sources
represent the perspective of the United States Army as an institution, and provide
essential details concerning the Rhine Gorge.
Of all the historical works published by the military, the most comprehensive and
thorough project is the series United States Army in World War II, or the green books as
they later became known due to their distinctive binding. (Figure Six) The reader’s guide
to the series, itself an official volume of the green books, identifies 78 volumes in total,
written between 1946 and 1992, covering every conceivable aspect of the army’s
involvement in World War II.106 The Center of Military History, a group of historians
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employed by the army, produced the series, bringing a professional and academic
approach to the project. Robert Coakley, a deputy chief historian for the Center of

Figure Six: The Last Offensive with Original Binding
Military History, claims that the guiding principle for the green books was to create a
history that was “complete and honest.”107 To facilitate that honesty, in 1947 President
Eisenhower issued a directive that the Center of Military History be granted full access to
documents from the war, ironically instructing them to create a history that would
provide legitimate lessons for future generations rather than only portraying the United
States favorably.108 Despite this intention, the publications still present an excessively
favorable perspective of the United States.
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There are two important facets of the green books that significantly impact how
they should be read. First, very few of the contributing authors had extensive training in
history writing. Most of them were retired veterans who transitioned to the Center of
Military History. As Coakley himself states, “few of us had any substantial historical
publications, military or otherwise, to our credit. So for the most part we had to learn by
doing.”109 Lack of pedigree does preclude historical accuracy, but the army could have
done a better job recruiting credited historians from outside their organization if their
intent was creating an unbiased history. Second, the thoroughness of the series
monopolizes the tactical narrative and discourages historians from providing new
analysis of the battles and the decisions military leaders made. Although not necessarily
nefarious, this monopolization is by design. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) M.C. Helfers, an
army historian writing in 1955, notes that the green books are intended to be the only
source that leaders need to consult to understand World War II. Additionally, the green
books discourage further analysis of tactics because historians are reticent to put hours of
study into a subject that had already been covered in such detail.110 No historical work is
beyond scrutiny, and the thoroughness of the green books should not shield them from
reasonable criticism. For that reason, the Center of Military History’s attempt to
meticulously craft an authoritative narrative does some harm in addition to the obvious
benefits of a comprehensive history.
The green book volume covering the crossing of the Rhine River is titled The Last
Offensive. Written by Charles MacDonald and published in 1973, it is admirably evenhanded and fair. MacDonald was a decorated World War II employed by the Center of
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Military History following the war. The relatively late publication of The Last Offensive
is due entirely to workload for the Center of Military history. Although they employed
dozens of authors, to complete the 78 volumes for World War II, most authors had to
write multiple volumes. MacDonald began his contributions to the green books with
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt in 1952. He followed that book with The
Siefgried Line Campaign in 1962, and finally The Last Offensive in 1973. Since the
writing of each green book involved sifting through thousands of preserved unit reports,
it is not surprising that MacDonald’s second and third volumes each took about a decade
to complete. While the world changed drastically between 1945 and 1973, the writing
process remained strikingly similar for the green book historians. They carefully read all
the relevant reports preserved in the National Archives, reviewed any unit histories
already published, and consulted the writings of key American leaders. Secondary
sources are referenced occasionally, but not consistently, meaning that the impact of
delayed publication is minimal.
Like many of his peers, MacDonald was a historian by trade, not training.
Although he was proficient with historical investigation and excelled in the use of
primary sources, he was less familiar with questions of historiography, historical context,
and source criticism. To his credit, he does not hesitate to point out challenges the army
faced, and even provides critiques; however, he stops short of any harsh criticism. In the
very first sentence, MacDonald asserts that the United States Army in 1945 was the most
powerful force in history to that point—a theme that he returns to repeatedly throughout
the text as his thesis.111 While that may very well be true, his introductory words
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foreshadow an incredibly positive portrayal of the army, even when discussing specific
missteps or potential failures. The reason for his tone is fundamentally a need to support
his overall thesis, but it also serves to protect the army’s reputation and promote
American exceptionalism. After all, he was employed by the army. MacDonald’s work
attempts to temper criticism and contextualize it in a way that prevents a contradiction of
his thesis.
Strategic decisions led up to the Rhine Gorge crossing. Before D-Day, GEN
Eisenhower and the Allied staff planned the entire invasion of Europe, to include the final
occupation of Germany. The original plans called for two thrusts into Germany from
Belgium and France, one in the north to capture the Ruhr industrial area and one in the
south to capture the Saar industrial area, as is depicted in Figure Seven.112 Running the

Figure Seven: Planned Rhine River Crossings
length of what had historically been the western border of Germany, the Rhine River
served as the final barrier to be crossed. While there were many different options
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considered, as the crossing of the Rhine River drew closer, GEN Eisenhower decided to
keep the original plan and cross in those same two regions. The southern crossing was
supposed to occur upstream of the Rhine Gorge in order to facilitate the capture of
Frankfurt and avoid the difficult terrain to the north.113
There were tactical reasons for prioritizing those two regions for the crossing of
the Rhine River, but there were also political considerations. The northern portion of the
Allied front consisted of the 21st Army Group, which was under British command and
included Canadian forces. The 6th Army Group was in the south and was commanded by
GEN Devers, an American, but included a French Army as well. The 12th Army Group
formed the center of the Allied front and consisted entirely of American forces—they
were conspicuously not featured in the plans for crossing the Rhine River. GEN
Eisenhower, as the Allied commander, was sensitive to the requests of the British and
French who used political channels to pressure him into giving them a greater role in the
final days of the war.114
Even though the geographical aspects of the plan remained unchanged as
preparations began for the Rhine River crossings, the unexpected capture of the
Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen by elements of the 12th Army Group significantly
changed the Allied strategy. GEN Eisenhower believed every single bridge across the
Rhine River would be destroyed by the Germans, meaning that boats would have to be
used to assault across the river and secure the far side so that pontoon bridges could be
constructed to enable large-scale crossings with heavy vehicles. Securing a bridge intact
meant that forces could be pushed quickly across the river without conducting a
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dangerous amphibious operation requiring careful planning and coordination of assets.
The capture of the bridge had to be exploited regardless of the original plan, and every
Allied leader knew it. Adjusting the strategic plan due to the events in Remagen
exemplifies the type of critical flexibility that wins wars, but as the plan flexed further the
potential for critical mistakes increased as subordinate commanders added their own
distinct amendments.
MacDonald’s description of Remagen’s impact illustrates his willingness to
critique some American leaders, even if he refuses to describe subsequent operations as
flawed. Specifically, MacDonald highlights the hubris of LTG Patton who sought to
dramatically rush across the Rhine and steal back the headlines from LTG Hodges’ First
Army and the capture of Remagen.115 Even as the Remagen bridgehead was being
exploited, GEN Montgomery continued to plan the crossing of the 21st Army Group north
of Remagen at Wesel in order to create multiple avenues of approach for the Allies into
Germany. Although GEN Montgomery was a methodical planner, the unanticipated
events at Remagen required him to execute his preparations quickly in order to support
the forces already across the river and prevent the Germans from massing at Remagen
and driving the Americans back across the river.
LTG Patton knew that GEN Montgomery would soon cross the Rhine, and now
that portions of the 12th Army Group had already deviated from the original plan by
crossing at Remagen, he was determined to beat his old rival from the African Theater by
quickly leading his forces across.116 The position of the 12th Army Group in the center of
the Allied line meant that entirely new sections of the Rhine River could be considered
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for crossing. (Figure Eight) With GEN Montgomery planning to begin his assault on the
evening of March 23, the 5th ID from LTG Patton’s Third Army crossed the Rhine River

Figure Eight: Allied Advance to Rhine River
in the early morning hours of that same day at Oppenheim, beating the British across.
The 5th ID soldiers crossed in paddled wooden boats without preparatory fires or any
significant artillery, air, or heavy weapons support.
The theory behind LTG Patton’s haste was that the Third Army could catch the
enemy by surprise in an area they did not expect an attack, but the reality was that LTG
Patton had pushed his forces faster than the enablers could support, so there were no
other options for the crossing.117 His plan rested entirely on the enemy not having any
significant defensive positions, and was motivated by the hubris of LTG Patton and his
desire to beat GEN Montgomery. Despite his motivation, LTG Patton’s gamble paid off
and the operation was spectacularly successful as the Germans were unable to mount a
117
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serious defense at that location. The capture of a bridge at Remagen forced the Allies to
cross the Rhine River more quickly than they had originally planned, and for leaders like
LTG Patton who were not originally supposed to conduct crossings it provided an
opportunity to seize a more important role.
Although the Third Army beat the 21st Army Group across the Rhine, LTG Patton
ordered LTG Middleton’s VIII Corps to conduct additional crossings in the Rhine Gorge
region. To his credit, MacDonald spends three paragraphs of his account discussing the
difficulty of the terrain in the Rhine Gorge, noting why a crossing there was ill-advised.
He concludes by saying, “A more unlikely spot for an assault crossing no one could have
chosen.”118 Reading carefully and using insight from other sources, one can infer that
choosing the treacherous terrain of the Rhine Gorge as a crossing site was a mistake, but
MacDonald does not explicitly identify it as such. Regardless, on the morning of March
25, the 87th ID assaulted across the Rhine Gorge at Boppard. The first wave received
some effective fire from the Germans, but their defense dissolved quickly, and the
following waves crossed with little opposition. Despite the light resistance, the 87th ID
still had difficulty crossing due to the fast current.119
The next day, the 89th ID conducted their crossings at St Goarshausen, Wellmich,
and Oberwesel. Wellmich was only a few miles north of St Goarshausen with Oberwesel
lying on the southern edge of the division boundary. Figure Nine shows how close the
89th ID sector was to the already successful crossings at Remagen, Oppenheim, and
Boppard. MacDonald notes that the defense was much more effective against the 89th ID

118
119

MacDonald, The Last Offensive, 274.
MacDonald, The Last Offensive, 275.

59

at Wellmich and St Goarshausen, where the enemy illuminated the River using a
gasoline-soaked barge and utilized grazing fire from 20mm anti-aircraft guns to inflict

Figure Nine: 12th Army Group Bridgeheads
over 200 casualties.120 He asserts that the German defense was not completely broken
until the afternoon of March 26 when a squadron of P-51 Mustang fighter planes
destroyed German gun positions in the vicinity of Lorelei Rock.121 Although MacDonald
does not say so, it was the late use of combined arms enablers during the day that allowed
the Americans to eventually succeed rather than the use of surprise tactics during the
night.
The scope of MacDonald’s work, covering the entire Allied front, does not allow
him to go into detail about the crossing of the 89th ID, but it does provide valuable
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context for the battle and allow for further critiques. In discussing the Rhine Gorge,
MacDonald indicates that the hubris of LTG Patton led to an inadvisable crossing, but he
stops short of blaming anyone or labeling the operation a mistake. In MacDonald’s
defense, he is attempting to describe a campaign that spanned hundreds of miles and
included the entire Allied front with hundreds of thousands of combatants. He outlines
large-scale operations rather than closely analyzing any single engagement. To address
such a massive subject, MacDonald primarily cites reports and documents preserved by
the army. With thousands of pages preserved, it would be impossible to track down firsthand accounts from junior soldiers for every engagement that occurred during the
Rhineland Campaign. However, without those first-hand accounts, he is left with only the
perspective of army leaders.
Even though The Last Offensive provides a more objective view of the United
States Army than the media provided in 1945, it is still part of an official project by the
military. MacDonald was employed by the army, and his argument represents the army
well. Since his thesis is that the United States Army was virtually unstoppable, dwelling
on mistakes would not further his argument even if he were willing to acknowledge them
occasionally. Therefore, he stops short of characterizing the entire Rhine Gorge crossing
as flawed.
While The Last Offensive provides the historical context for the crossing of the
Rhine Gorge, The 89th Infantry Division: 1942-1945 provides more detailed information
about how the operation was planned and executed, with almost no consideration of
operational context.122 Published in 1947 by the division historical board, it is an official
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army publication, even if it is not part of the green book project or published by the
Center of Military History. It was commissioned by the 89th ID, overseen by staffers
within the unit, and produced primarily for the soldiers and family members who wanted
to read about heroic service rather than tactical blunders. Featuring small print on 8.5
inch by 11 inch sheets and reaching 270 pages, it is a significant volume, even though
dozens of pictures reduce the length of the narrative. Although informative with citations
noting which reports were consulted, none of the authors were historians and the project
should not be treated as a peer-reviewed, academic history book.123 However, the focus
on the 89th ID makes it invaluable for analysis of the Rhine Gorge crossing. The division
history even contains a copy of the order issued by division headquarters on March 25,
1945.
Careful analysis of the division order reveals that the 89th ID was clearly
attempting to surprise the Germans, even though the Germans had been observing them
and would have been expecting an attack. Additionally, the division organized its forces
for a combined arms assault with multiple enablers meaning that any failure to
incorporate enablers must have occurred at echelons below the division level. The order
states that VIII Corps assigned the 89th ID with the section of the Rhine between Kestert
and Kaub. In turn, the 89th ID divided their section at Urbar, assigning 354th IN with the
northern section and 353rd IN with the southern section. The 353rd IN is listed first in the

123

The title page lists a total of seven individual authors referred to collectively as the 89th Infantry
Division Historical Board. The authors were MAJ Maynard L. Diamond, LT Willard E. Simms, CPL
Edward B. Baldinger, CPL Meyer Siegelbaum, TEC4 Louis H. Cook, TEC4 Ernest W. Fair, and TEC4 Hal
G. Evarts, Jr. As the ranking member, MAJ Diamond would have likely functioned as a senior editor and
project manager. As the only other commissioned officer, LT Simms could have been the only writer with a
college degree. While a college education is certainly not a prerequisite for writing good history, the
historical board lacked any academic training in source criticism or formal history writing. Their purpose
was less historical specificity and more memorialization and promotion of the unit.

62

order, which would normally mean their mission was the priority; however, the allocation
of assets indicates that 354th IN was the decisive operation. To support their crossing, the
354th IN had a tank destroyer company and a medical company attached. In direct
support, they had a company of engineers with additional engineers from a second
element as well as two 155mm and one 105mm field artillery battalions. Also, all artillery
assigned to the division had a “be prepared to” support mission for 354th IN. Finally, 30
paddled boats and 10 motorized boats were assigned for St Goarshausen while 55
paddled boats and 10 motorized boats were assigned for Wellmich.124 The ordered start
time of 0200 and the reliance on paddled boats indicates that the division intended to
repeat the strategy of surprise used at Oppenheim and Boppard. However, it would be
difficult to achieve surprise a second time using the same strategy.
As the 89th ID prepared to cross the Rhine Gorge, they passed through the 76th ID
who had been occupying the west side of the river. The 76th ID had been sporadically
engaging targets across the river and gathering aerial photos in preparation for offensive
maneuvers, which would have made surprising the enemy with a crossing even more
difficult.125 Unlike the Oppenheim crossing where the availability of enablers was
limited, the 89th ID had 304 artillery pieces as well as aerial cover from the XIX Tactical
Air Command supporting their operation.126 In another move that prematurely
telegraphed the American’s intention to cross the Rhine Gorge to the Germans, the 89th
ID conducted an artillery barrage the evening prior to the assault. Therefore, it is not
surprising that as the first wave began to cross at St Goarshausen and Wellmich, the
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Germans were prepared for their attack. The defenders initiated with heavy small arms
fire, machine guns, and 20mm ant-aircraft guns; they even illuminated the entire
engagement area by shooting a barge soaked in gasoline, providing clear fields of fire on
the American soldiers trying desperately to paddle their way across the stiff current.127
Demonstrated by the effective defense mounted as the first waves of soldiers struggled
across the river, it was clearly misguided to assume that the enemy could be surprised in
the Rhine Gorge. Without a smoke screen or covering fire from supporting elements, they
were completely exposed to the German weapons. Even though the division organized
for a combined arms assault, the vital enablers were not used effectively to support the
crossing until much later during the daytime.
The detailed descriptions in the division history of the initial crossing are couched
in terms of heroism and achievement, but a close reading reveals the sort of chaos
indicative of a flawed operation. At St Goarshausen, E Co and F Co were tasked with
establishing a foothold on the other side of the Rhine Gorge, taking the high ground north
of town as well as the town itself. The first wave consisted of about 25% of F Co and
nearly all of E Co. Those boats were hit the hardest, with three of the four boats from one
platoon being destroyed in a matter of minutes. Only 11 men from another platoon made
it to the other side.128 The boat containing the headquarters section from E Co was
destroyed as they crossed, killing both the Company Commander and the Company First
Sergeant.129 Losing two of the top three leaders for the company would have been
crippling. Typically, key leaders are separated on the battlefield to prevent such a loss,
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but either they failed to appropriately plan, or they were rushed into the boats causing the
mistake.
The remnants of E Co and F Co that crossed consolidated on the far side and did
what they could to destroy enemy defensive positions, but they had trouble
communicating with their battalion support elements and had limited combat power. The
communication problems represent a failure in planning since the incorporation of
supporting fire during an operation requires redundancy in the communication plan so
that assaulting units are never entirely cut off from their enablers. The rest of E Co and F
Co crossed after sunrise at about 0800, and by 1000 the first element of G Co began to
cross.130 The plan had called for a surprise attack aided by the cover of darkness, but
because surprise was not the correct tactic for the Rhine Gorge crossing the reserve
elements were not able to reinforce the attack until the sun rose, which was a costly
delay.

Figure Ten: 89th ID Area of Operations131

130
131

89th Infantry Division Historical Board, The 89th Infantry Division, 101.
Base Map from Google Maps, labels added using Microsoft PowerPoint.

65

A Co had similar experiences at Wellmich as they initiated their crossing
simultaneously with the St Goarshausen attack. Being the first element to cross, A Co
sustained heavy casualties, and C Co halted their movement after seeing the struggles A
Co experienced. The portions of A Co that made it across the river consolidated on the
far side, deciding to wait for reinforcements before continuing their attack. Like the St
Goarshausen assault, the cover of darkness did little to achieve surprise but forced the
unit to delay reinforcement. At dawn, the remainder of A Co and C Co crossed, aided by
two American tank destroyers providing covering fire. These combined arms enablers
proved decisive once they were finally employed. B Co, the reserve element, crossed at
1430 during the daytime and proceeded into Wellmich, clearing the town.132
In addition to the specific details provided by The 89th Infantry Division, several
important observations can be inferred about the tactical decisions of American leaders
using the division history, even if they are not specifically highlighted. First, the enemy
was fully prepared for and anticipating another Allied crossing in the Rhine Gorge—even
if surprise would ordinarily have been an effective tactic, it was not appropriate for that
specific situation. Second, the 89th ID was unable to effectively mask their movement
across the Rhine Gorge with a smoke screen. The division history notes that the winds
were blowing to the west, making it impossible to employ the division smoke
generators.133 While that analysis is correct, it fails to account for the delivery of smoke
rounds with indirect fire systems. During World War II, the army possessed the ability to
create a smoke screen using mortars. With proper planning and preparation, smoke could
have been provided by firing it on the east side of the Rhine Gorge. Third, a significant
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amount of combat power, including tanks and tank destroyers, were held in reserve as
part of Task Force Johnson which was intended to quickly exploit the bridgehead once it
was established.134 The idea of a mounted reserve was common, but it could have been
employed earlier to support the crossings, especially as the initial waves ran into
significant resistance. Finally, the division historical board corroborates the claim in The
Last Offensive that the aerial support from P-51 Mustangs during the afternoon was
decisive in breaking the German defense of the Rhine Gorge.135 Smoke, armored support,
and aerial support were all critical combined arms enablers that were decisive in the
eventual success of the crossing and should have been used from the outset, but the
division history fails to identify their delayed usage as a mistake.
Overall, The 89th Infantry Division focuses on the heroic actions of soldiers in the
face of difficult circumstances rather than questioning the decisions of leaders. In fact,
the division history never critiques leaders at all. Although the focus on heroism and
effective leadership is likely intentional considering the audience, it is also inevitable
considering the sources consulted. At the end of the chapter covering the Rhine Gorge,
the list of references consists entirely of orders and reports generated by headquarters
sections, supplemented only by letters from the 89th ID commander.136 Although not
specifically mentioned, the historical board would have also had access to the citations
for valorous awards issued to specific soldiers who demonstrated heroism. However, the
historical board apparently made no attempt to conduct interviews with any of the
soldiers who witnessed the events first-hand. By only consulting with leaders, the
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division history naturally summarizes their combat by grandiosely stating they “had made
two historic river crossings and driven deep into the soil of the Third Reich to establish
themselves as aggressive combat veterans.”137 The soldiers who saw their friends cut
down like targets at a firing range in the middle of the river would have given the board a
more nuanced perspective. Still, the level of detail provided helps piece together the
events of March 26, 1945. The 89th Infantry Division provides less tactical analysis than
The Last Offensive, but what it lacks in analysis it makes up for in detail.
Although the official histories are valuable, they are not the only sources available
concerning the Rhine Gorge crossing. There are multiple After Action Reports (AARs)
written by the units involved that have been preserved. They were written immediately
following the events, so they present an unfiltered view of what each unit headquarters
experienced. One surviving AAR belonged to the 354th IN, the regiment that crossed at St
Goarshausen and Wellmich. The AAR relevant to this discussion covers the actions of
the regiment from March 12 to March 31, written by CPT Corwin Spencer, the
regimental adjutant. Adjutants were clerical workers, and as the regimental adjutant CPT
Spencer served as a personal assistant for the regimental commander, COL Robert Aloe.
The AAR is intended to be the commander’s official report of events occurring during the
referenced time period and is signed by COL Aloe himself.
The 354th IN AAR reveals that the regiment had more information about the
enemy they would be facing than the official histories indicate. For instance, the
regimental and battalion command groups had the opportunity to do extensive
reconnaissance from the west side of the river while planning their operation. They also
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conducted a thorough intelligence handover with the 76th ID, who identified multiple
enemy fighting positions on the high ground surrounding St Goarshausen. In fact, the
AAR indicates that the 76th ID had conducted several patrols across the river over the
previous three nights, developing a detailed understanding of the enemy defenses, which
featured the powerful 20mm anti-aircraft guns. Also, 354th IN received sporadic small
arms and artillery fire from St Goarshausen throughout March 25 as they were planning
their assault, further proving that the enemy was prepared to defend that section of the
Rhine.138
Although the division history and The Last Offensive are generally consistent with
the AAR, their failure to recognize this small matter of intelligence is significant. It was
not just a matter of the Germans knowing that the Americans were going to cross the
Rhine Gorge—354th IN knew that the Germans were actively preparing for an assault by
US forces. Considering that information, continuing to plan for a surprise attack seems
incredibly reckless. Additionally, detailed knowledge of enemy defensive positions could
have resulted in complete neutralization of them during the initial attack with the proper
use of indirect and direct fire enablers. However, the AAR does not accentuate that fact,
and the official histories failed to acknowledge it. COL Aloe certainly does not admit
planning a flawed operation.
The 354th IN AAR also provides some details about the Rhine Gorge crossing that
are not mentioned elsewhere. First, it states that a captured German soldier later claimed
they allowed the first wave of soldiers crossing at Wellmich to make it most of the way
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across before engaging them in order to divide the unit and maximize the effect of direct
fires. Such actions demonstrate an alert defense that could not be easily surprised. The
AAR also confirms that tank destroyers and anti-tank 57mm guns were used effectively
at Wellmich once the sun rose, further demonstrating the importance of combined arms
enablers. Finally, the medical portion of the AAR lists the casualty numbers; 35 bodies
were recovered, and 112 wounded soldiers evacuated by 354th IN. Additionally, 65
soldiers were presumed dead, but their bodies had not been recovered from the river.139
The numbers provide an idea of how many casualties were sustained, but they do not tell
the whole story. The bodies and wounded soldiers evacuated were limited to what the
354th IN processed, and the numbers for presumed dead only include 354th IN. There
were other enablers such as the engineers whose numbers are not included.
The high casualty rate, the crucial role of covering fire from supporting elements,
and the surprisingly effective German defenses all paint a more complex picture of the
Rhine Gorge battle than what is found in the official histories. Unfortunately, they are all
subtle points that are not belabored within the AAR. Since AARs are basic reports the
regiment was required to produce they do not contain in depth historical analysis. CPT
Spencer was not a historian or military strategist; he was a capable staff officer, but
someone who was far-removed from the front lines and produced a written record
intended to reflect the perspective of his commander. Interviewing the soldiers who
participated was beyond the scope of his duties.
The battalion level records for the crossing of the Rhine Gorge were not
preserved, but some of the company level records are still available. Specifically, the
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morning reports for F Co provide some limited insight into the small unit perspective.
Morning reports only existed at the company level and were primarily used to track
personnel. They were written on pre-printed forms approximately 4 inches wide and 10
inches tall, with spaces for marking the number of officers and enlisted personnel present
along with their duty statuses. At the bottom of each form there was space for a short
summary of the day’s events.
There are two separate notes by F Co concerning the Rhine Gorge crossing. The
first note, from March 25, states that the company moved to St Goar in preparation for
the assault and conducted reconnaissance and planning.140 The fact that companies were
afforded an opportunity to conduct their own reconnaissance is significant because it
means that there was adequate time to conduct a deliberate crossing of the river rather
than a hasty attack relying on the element of surprise. The second note, from March 26,
states that a single platoon from F Co landed on the far side at 0300 with the rest of the
company landing at 0915, which corroborates the accounts in the division history and the
regimental AAR.141 Since the space available for summaries was limited, not much can
be gleaned from those statements, but the importance of daylight is clear.
In addition to the surviving records from the 89th ID, there are a handful of
records still available from other units that were tasked with supporting the 89th ID. For
instance, both the 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion (TD) and the 748th Tank Battalion
(TK) produced AARs that were preserved. Like the 354th IN AARs, they are written by
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staff officers and represent the commander’s perspective. The 602nd TD was a formation
unique to that time period. Tank destroyers looked much like other American tanks. They
were equipped with powerful weapon systems and powered by tracks rather than wheels,
but they did not have the thick armor of a tank. The idea was that they would be fast
enough to avoid being engaged by enemy tanks. The AAR notes that even though they
were attached to the 89th ID for the crossing, most of their combat power was held in
reserve with Task Force Johnson. Rather than supporting the crossing itself, the 602nd TD
was pushed north to Boppard, crossing in the 87th ID area of operations before cutting
south and linking up with the 89th ID on the other side.142
The 748th TK consisted of actual tanks, possessing the armor needed to survive
hits from large weapons. Although they were not attached to Task Force Johnson, most of
the 748th TK crossed at Boppard as well, following behind Task Force Johnson. The
AAR indicates that they were pushed north due to the difficult terrain in vicinity of St
Goar which might have prevented them from driving down to the treadway bridge that
was supposed to be constructed there. The AAR does not mention any discussion of
employing the tanks to cover the initial movement of soldiers across the river.143
The 602nd TD and 748th TK AARs demonstrate that the initial lack of covering
fire from available tanks and tank destroyers was more than simply an oversight. The 89th
ID intentionally withheld them from the fight, relying on the element of surprise rather
than massing their combat power to support what they should have known would be a
contested river crossing.
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Another surviving AAR was produced by the commander of United States Naval
Forces in France for the commander-in-chief of the Navy. After D-Day, many of the
landing craft used for the invasion were transported over land for use in the Rhine River
crossings. The naval commander notes that his forces struggled to keep up with the pace
of LTG Patton’s Third Army, and barely made it to Oppenheim in time to support the
first crossings of the Rhine River.144 The boats were intended to be used to support the
crossings at St Goarshausen, but when 354th IN began to struggle against the strong
enemy positions, the 89th ID pushed the boats down to Oberwesel instead, rather than
risking the loss of the naval assets.145 It is interesting to note that powered landing craft
were available to assist in the crossing, but were diverted to the location where resistance
was lightest. Incorporating all available assets, a deliberate crossing of the Rhine Gorge
could have used powered naval craft to quickly shuttle soldiers across the river, covering
their movement using hundreds of artillery pieces and dozens of tanks, and masking their
movement using smoke.
Considering the struggles faced by the 89th ID, it would stand to reason that Third
Army would note what went wrong in order to prevent the same mistakes from being
made in the future. However, the Third Army AAR only dedicates a total of four
sentences to the crossing of the Rhine Gorge, and conflates the crossings of the 87th ID
and the 89th ID. Unlike regimental and division AARs, Army AARs like the one
produced by Third Army were a deliberate operation with significant resourcing. The
Third Army AARs fill 10 volumes which were bound into books and even illustrated.
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The size and deliberate nature of these specific AARs make a lack of information even
more notable.
The only analysis provided for the Rhine Gorge crossing states, “Generally, stiffer
resistance was encountered in the VIII Corps bridgehead than had been met in the
bridgehead of XII Corps.”146 There are three possible reasons for Third Army recording
such little detail. First, not all actions conducted at the division level could be discussed
in depth. With multiple corps and several divisions making up Third Army, brevity was
necessary, and only the actions that had a direct impact on the decisions made at the army
level could be discussed at length. Second, it is possible that the 89th ID and VIII Corps
did not provide a lot of details to Third Army headquarters. If the division and corps
commanders believed that serious mistakes were made on their part, it would have been
natural to forego dwelling on their mistakes in the reports to higher. Third, it is possible
that Third Army understood that their rush to make it across the Rhine River had resulted
in a poorly executed operation. For that reason, they may have intentionally downplayed
the crossings of the Rhine Gorge. While all three reasons likely factored into the limited
comments contributed by Third Army, the intensity of the fight and the sheer number of
assets dedicated to the operation mean that the Rhine Gorge could not have gone entirely
unnoticed by Third Army headquarters. Therefore, they must have purposely downplayed
the events.
The official histories and army records provide much information about the
crossing of the Rhine Gorge by the 89th ID, especially when they are compared with each
other. It is helpful to note which details were communicated by each source, as well as
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which details were left out. The army sources all reflect specific perspectives but
grouping them together creates a consensus army perspective, atop of which sits The Last
Offensive, the green book intended to be the final official word on the matter.
The army was honest and detailed in discussing the Rhine Gorge crossing, but
also unwilling to characterize the battle as a flawed operation. When telling the story, the
United States Army did not dwell on all the mistakes that were made or examine how the
operation could have been conducted to reduce the loss of life. While it is possible to
infer critiques, they were not offered by the authors. The army perspective is not
surprising since few organizations seek to advertise their mistakes unless they are forced
to do so. It may not represent an overt attempt by the government to cover up anything,
but it is clearly limited. The lower echelon reports provide details that can be pieced
together to demonstrate that tactical blunders were made, but they do not overtly identify
them as such. As the account was generalized at higher echelons, details were left out
without conducting any analysis into potential mistakes, to the extent that Third Army
hardly mentioned the Rhine Gorge at all. The official histories provide details, but their
assessments are clearly lacking because they were unwilling to cast an overtly negative
shadow over the actions of the American forces. Clearly, more perspectives are needed to
fully understand what happened.
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CHAPTER THREE
NARRATIVE CRAFTING BY ARMY LEADERS
Each of the Allies had, according to its means, contributed to the
common cause but America had stood pre-eminent as the arsenal of
democracy.
—GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower147

The United States military and the media controlled the narrative most Americans
received both during and after World War II, but organizations are nothing more than the
people within them. It is easy to make sweeping statements about groups without
recognizing the individuals exerting the greatest influence within or upon them. Some of
the most influential personalities impacting the World War II narrative are the American
generals who comprised the highest echelons of Allied leadership. During the war these
generals kept meticulous notes, and at the conclusion of the war several of them wrote
books providing their perspectives on the war; but their books do more than simply offer
another perspective—they actively seek to control the narrative of the war in specific
ways. Namely, they seek to shift the United States politically to exert stronger global
influence at the beginning of the Cold War and memorialize the soldiers who died during
the war. Regarding themselves, they seek personal recognition by justifying their
decisions, refuting counter narratives and presenting an empathetic view of their
leadership. The overarching theme of their writings is American exceptionalism,
regardless of their specific intentions. Even some of the generals that did not produce
carefully crafted accounts provide interviews or leave behind notes, seeking to control
how particular events and people are remembered.
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Regarding the crossing of the Rhine Gorge, there is not any lengthy discussion or
analysis by American generals. As with the media, understanding their perspectives
requires carefully examining the little they did say and recognizing what they did not say.
The generals from division commander through supreme Allied commander were all
familiar with the crossing and at least close enough to know that mistakes were made.
But they were also far enough removed from the situation to avoid justifying the crossing
in detail since the strategic ramifications were limited despite the human cost. The
generals provide varying levels of positive narration in order to reinforce their own
versions of American exceptionalism while simultaneously distancing themselves in
subtle ways.
Interestingly, three of the most prolific narrative crafting American generals were
in the chain of command for the 89th ID in March 1945: GEN Eisenhower, GEN Bradley,
and LTG Patton. After the war, GEN Eisenhower went on to have a successful political
career, serving two terms as the President of the United States. His political chops served
him well during the war, and in the late 1940s he produced his personal account of World
War II, titled Crusade in Europe. Eisenhower argues that the United States was the
primary force responsible for the defeat of Germany, an evil empire. For him, the war
serves as evidence that the United States should be more globally minded and continue to
assert itself as a force for democracy and freedom.148
Unlike GEN Eisenhower, GEN Bradley did not have blatant global political
intentions when he crafted his account. GEN Bradley tries to explain how military leaders
made tactical decisions, highlighting the humanity of leadership.149 However, within his
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honest discussion of flawed leaders, GEN Bradley argues that the humanity of certain
generals made the greatness of their achievements all the more impressive.150 In a very
real sense, GEN Bradley seeks to justify the decisions of American military leaders by
candidly acknowledging flaws while highlighting pure intentions and overwhelmingly
positive results.
LTG Patton did not have a chance to create a finely crafted argument with his
memoirs—he died before they could be completed; but he clearly intended to publish his
own account and was working on the manuscript as the war concluded. After his death,
LTG Patton’s notes were edited and published by his wife in a book titled War As I Knew
It.151 The tone of his posthumous book is undeniably self-serving. He speaks of the
historic greatness of his unit.152 He compares himself to leaders like Caesar, Scipio
Africanus, and William the Conqueror.153 A completed memoir may have had a more
subtle argument, but the surviving account of LTG Patton demonstrates his fundamental
desire to secure his own legacy. Rather than promoting global politics or humanizing
American leaders, LTG Patton wanted to establish his own place in history. However,
even his self-serving focus on legacy is congruous with the promotion of American
exceptionalism.
While they did not produce their own accounts, the corps and division
commanders responsible for the crossing of the Rhine Gorge did attempt to control the
narrative in less obvious ways. LTG Middleton spent hours recounting his perspective on
the war for a biographer in the 1970s. He claims that he did not write an autobiography

150

Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, xxx.
Patton, War As I Knew It, xiii.
152
Patton, War As I Knew It, 105.
153
Patton, War As I Knew It, 273.
151

78

because it would damage the reputation of respected colleagues.154 That may be the case,
but he clearly seeks to justify his own decisions and highlight his successes with his
interviews. Since he did not immediately write his own story and did not provide
interviews until the 1970s, LTG Middleton is more interested in setting the record
straight regarding specific portions of the already hardening original narrative.
MG Finley did not leave behind much at all in the form of published
documentation. Letters and memos survive in the 89th ID history, but little more. There
are also short references to him in other historical accounts, providing a little insight into
how he thought. The one theme in MG Finley’s letters that distinguishes him from the
other generals is an obvious remorse for the soldiers lost under his command, but he still
treats the crossing of the Rhine Gorge as an overwhelming success. When combined,
analysis of the five leaders who comprised the chain of command, from division
commander to supreme allied commander, shows how they each attempted to control the
narrative of World War II and, specifically, how they remembered the crossing of the
Rhine Gorge and ignored tactical mistakes in order to support their argument.
GEN Eisenhower’s career during World War II is one of the most incredible
examples of military advancement in history, as he began the war wearing the rank of
Major but rose to the position of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe—
earning the highest possible rank, General of the Army, or five-star General.155 GEN
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Eisenhower served during World War I, and even though he was a competent and
intelligent officer, he was caught in the stagnation of the interwar period. He was only a
relatively low-level staff officer at the beginning of World War II. The turning point for
GEN Eisenhower’s career was the first iteration of the Louisiana Maneuvers designed by
GEN Marshall. These were the same maneuvers in which the 89th ID would participate
just two years later. In 1941, GEN Eisenhower served as the Chief of Staff for LTG
Walter Krueger, who was the commander of Third Army at the time.156 GEN Eisenhower
performed so well in that position he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General at
the conclusion of the exercise, entirely skipping the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and
Colonel.157 After spending a few months working directly for GEN Marshall as a planner,
GEN Eisenhower was chosen to lead the Allied invasion of Europe, arriving in London in
early 1942.158
GEN Eisenhower was selected to lead the Allied effort in Europe due to his
fundamental belief in the importance of cooperation between the Allied powers. That
fundamental belief permeates his account of World War II, and he identifies the unity of
effort in Europe as a “miracle of achievement.”159 Although he describes it as miraculous,
GEN Eisenhower directly attributes the close cooperation of the Allies to the steadfast
devotion of all parties involved to a single strategy. He argues that the Allies won World
War II because their leaders “never wavered from their purpose of launching a full-out
invasion of Europe across the English Channel at the earliest practicable moment.”160
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GEN Eisenhower believed the Allies defeated Germany because they fought together
with a singular strategy. The execution of that singular strategy required unity of
command, and the United States provided both unity of command and the bulk of the
military capital necessary to win.161
The overall argument GEN Eisenhower makes in his autobiography is important
because it dominates his entire account. He argues that the United States was woefully
unprepared for World War II due to foolish isolationist politics.162 He aggressively
promotes the idea that the United States was the “arsenal of democracy.”163 Writing in
the late 1940s, GEN Eisenhower was one of several American leaders who saw the rise
of the Soviet Union as an existential threat to democracy—a threat that would require the
United States to exert itself on the global stage in an unprecedented manner, building on
the active role America played in World War II in order to protect and promote
democracy. GEN Eisenhower states that “the world is now too small for the rigid
concepts of national sovereignty.”164 In his mind, America had to continue being the
arsenal of democracy and exert more global influence to resist communism—a goal that
could only be achieved, “if the men and women of America face this issue as squarely
and bravely as their soldiers faced the terrors of battle in World War II.”165 With such
grandiose political convictions and aspirations, it was extremely important for GEN
Eisenhower to positively portray the actions of the United States military in World War
II. His entire political platform was based on the idea that America’s success in the war
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was a template for proactively taking the fight to communism rather than allowing a new
evil to threaten democracy as the Nazi regime had done in the 1930s and 1940s.
Due to his emphasis on increased global interaction and intervention by the
United States, it is easy to see why GEN Eisenhower strongly promotes American
exceptionalism in his book. In order to step up as the global protector, the country and the
military, as the arsenal of democracy, must be the best. Everything about the American
experience in World War II must support the idea that the United States is uniquely
qualified to spread and protect democracy globally. Rather than simply being informed
by the Cold War, GEN Eisenhower was one of the primary architects setting the
conditions for how global politics would unfold in the decades that followed.
Given the importance of a unified strategy to GEN Eisenhower, it is not surprising
that he had a balanced plan for crossing the Rhine River. Rather than rushing across the
river as quickly as possible, he wanted to clear the east side of the river along its entire
length, establishing a strong defensive line from which a coordinated assault could be
made at multiple points. His plan for multiple crossing points along the length of the
Rhine contradicted the British desire to focus entirely on the northern section where their
forces would be taking the lead.166 Even though GEN Eisenhower convinced his British
subordinates that they needed to wait for American and French forces to establish strong
defensive positions along the Rhine, he seized the opportunity to cross early with
American forces when the bridge at Remagen was captured. In fact, GEN Eisenhower
takes credit for the exploitation of Remagen and describes it as “one of my happy
moments of the war.”167
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With American forces pouring across the Rhine at Remagen, GEN Eisenhower’s
deliberate strategy began to unravel, even though he later approved of the initiative taken
by other American commanders. Specifically, the crossings south of Remagen did not
proceed according to GEN Eisenhower’s plan. While Remagen was a fortunate accident,
GEN Eisenhower still intended to have two primary crossings with the 21st Army Group
in the North and the American Seventh Army in the South, part of GEN Devers’ 6th
Army Group. However, when GEN Bradley’s 12th Army Group began crossing at
Remagen, it prompted LTG Patton to drive hard for the Rhine River as well. His first
crossing at Oppenheim happened without GEN Eisenhower even knowing, although he
indicates that it was well executed.168 It is unclear if GEN Eisenhower truly approved of
all the crossings made by LTG Patton’s Third Army. GEN Eisenhower had a long history
with LTG Patton, and he describes LTG Patton as “an outstanding leader of troops.”169
However, GEN Eisenhower also specifically petitioned GEN Marshall to appoint GEN
Bradley as an Army Group Commander, with LTG Patton serving as a subordinate Army
commander, even though he was senior at the time. He favored GEN Bradley because he
was “sound, painstaking, and broadly educated.”170 Essentially, GEN Bradley was more
patient and controlled as a commander.
It is difficult to know how much GEN Eisenhower knew about the Rhine Gorge
crossings and even more difficult to know how he truly felt about them. Although GEN
Eisenhower admits that the Oppenheim crossings were highly successful, he seems to
back away from the Rhine Gorge crossings, spending even less time in his memoirs on
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them than he does on LTG Patton’s previous crossing. Interestingly, he notes that
“because of the rugged banks, bridging operations against an enemy looked almost
impossible,” indicating an uncharacteristic skepticism, followed by the phrase,
“nevertheless, the VIII Corps made the attempt and, in spite of some sharp initial
resistance, was successful.”171 In contrast to Remagen, where GEN Eisenhower takes
credit for the actions of his subordinates, or Oppenheim, where he seems to retroactively
approve of the actions of his subordinates, GEN Eisenhower noticeably distances himself
from the decision-making process at the Rhine Gorge. Rather than describing them as
acting on his orders or executing his intent, he places the decision to cross the Rhine
Gorge squarely on the shoulders of VIII Corps. Even though he notes that it was
ultimately successful, he uses a portion of his short paragraph on the Rhine Gorge
crossings to note the “sharp initial resistance” and “rugged banks.”172 Considering the
overall argument GEN Eisenhower is making in his book, it would be almost impossible
for him to portray the Rhine Gorge in a blatantly negative light. If he were to openly
criticize the choices of his subordinates, it would have undermined the idea that America
led a miraculously unified and almost perfectly organized effort to defeat an evil regime
during World War II.
Unlike GEN Eisenhower whose career jumpstarted at the beginning of the war,
GEN Bradley was already a brigadier general and the commandant of the Infantry School
when the war began.173 From the outset, GEN Bradley was slated to be a prominent
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commander, first with the 82nd ID and later with the 28th ID in 1943.174 Before he even
had a chance to make it overseas, GEN Bradley had already been given command of a
corps.175 In fact, GEN Bradley remained a corps commander as the United States Army
moved through Africa and up into Italy in 1943, even as LTG Patton was serving as the
Seventh Army commander, a position of greater responsibility.176 The turning point for
GEN Bradley came during preparations for the invasion of Normandy, when he was
appointed as commander of First Army, and identified as the future commander of the
planned 12th Army Group.177 Although GEN Bradley’s leapfrog over LTG Patton may
have been transparent to him, GEN Eisenhower records in detail why he asked GEN
Marshall to put GEN Bradley in command of the only American Army Group. He valued
the calm and calculated demeanor of GEN Bradley and believed that LTG Patton was
better suited to take command of Third Army.178
When composing his account of World War II, GEN Bradley did not have the
same kind of political theory that GEN Eisenhower weaved through Crusade in Europe,
but he did have a distinct purpose. In his book, A Soldier’s Story, GEN Bradley seeks to
explain exactly how commanders converted strategy into tactics on the ground.179 He
attempts to show how the personalities of imperfect commanders affected missions, but
he also wants to vindicate their actions by highlighting the success they achieved despite
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their flaws.180 The American leaders were only human, and their humanity further
exemplified the exceptional nature of what they achieved during the war.
Even though GEN Bradley typically agreed with GEN Eisenhower’s strategy of
consolidating forces along the length of the Rhine River before pushing across, his
perspective changed when First Army captured the bridge at Remagen. GEN Bradley had
accepted the fact that the other two Army Groups would conduct the two primary
crossings. In fact, he had supported GEN Eisenhower by curbing LTG Patton’s desire to
race across the Rhine before the British and French were able to do so.181 The tension
between GEN Bradley and LTG Patton was palpable after their role reversal before the
invasion of Normandy, and he considered LTG Patton to be a loose cannon. He writes,
“George was still an impetuous man and even in Europe this impetuous nature continued
to make trouble.”182 However, when First Army captured Remagen making it clear that
the 12th Army Group would be able to cross the Rhine in force, GEN Bradley let loose
the impetuous LTG Patton. He did not want to allow the Germans to build up their own
defenses along the Rhine, so he instructed LTG Patton to “take the Rhine on the run.”
Even though he intentionally gave LTG Patton the chance to cross the Rhine, the “speed
and flair of Third Army’s reckless advance,” still caught him by surprise.183
When he allowed him to surge forward, GEN Bradley knew LTG Patton’s intent
was to cross the Rhine River south of the Rhine Gorge at Oppenheim, and he approved of
that idea, even though LTG Patton executed the crossing much faster than he
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anticipated.184 Although surprised by the speed of Third Army, GEN Bradley strongly
believed that crossing the Rhine as quickly as possible was preferable to the deliberate
strategy of Field Marshall Montgomery and the 21st Army Group.185 Just as GEN
Eisenhower takes credit for the exploitation of Remagen, GEN Bradley takes credit for
the crossing at Oppenheim by Third Army. Even though it was LTG Patton that executed
the crossing, GEN Bradley describes in detail how he wisely gave LTG Patton the needed
permission to surge across. According to GEN Bradley, he understood the temperament
of his subordinate and knew how to use it positively. However, he does not even discuss
the subsequent crossings of Third Army in the Rhine Gorge. The only comment he makes
about them is vague: “Patton struggled to tighten his grip on a small but severely
contested bridgehead north of Main.”186 Even more so than GEN Eisenhower, GEN
Bradley distances himself from the Rhine Gorge crossings. He claims to provide a
detailed description of the flaws and imperfections of commanders, but he almost entirely
skips the struggles of the 89th ID, failing to even mention the division by name.
In his memoirs, even though he is more than willing to discuss what he considers
to be personality flaws in leaders like LTG Patton, GEN Bradley is not interested in
exposing serious tactical errors made by the United States military. His purpose is to
demonstrate overwhelming tactical success despite the imperfections of leaders.
Additionally, GEN Bradley seems to highlight his own ability to manipulate and
compensate for the character flaws of other commanders. To portray the actions of his
own unit as tactically unsound would have seriously questioned GEN Bradley’s ability as
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a commander, regardless of the overall outcome of the war. Therefore, the crossing of the
Rhine Gorge is characterized by GEN Bradley as “severely contested” rather than
strategically unnecessary or tactically unsound.
Although LTG Patton certainly intended to write an epic account of World War
II, he never had the chance due to his untimely death in 1945. However, he kept copious
notes in preparation for a comprehensive work at the conclusion of the war, and those
notes were edited and published by his wife in a book titled War As I Knew It. Because it
is little more than a compilation of notes, there is no unified thesis or purpose for the
book, but there are some unmistakable themes. First, LTG Patton is obsessed with his
own legacy. He often references great military leaders of the past and seeks to surpass
their accomplishments. His notes are littered with historic comparisons. For example, he
writes in the months following the Normandy invasion that, “As of August 14 the Third
Army had advanced farther and faster than any army in history.”187
In addition to his historic legacy, LTG Patton is obsessed with defining his own
nature. GEN Bradley referred to LTG Patton as impetuous—such a description would
have pleased LTG Patton even if it were not intended as a compliment. LTG Patton plays
up the idea that he was a loose cannon with unrestrainable ambition. He proudly notes his
resistance to GEN Eisenhower’s plan of halting at the Rhine River to prepare for a twopronged assault in the north and south. According to LTG Patton, he told GEN Bradley,
“unless I could continue attacking, I would have to be relieved.”188 He indicates that GEN
Bradley did not care for Field Marshall Montgomery’s plan to cross the Rhine
deliberately, corroborating GEN Bradley’s account. LTG Patton understood the larger
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picture, but unashamedly pushed beyond the limits of his orders to secure his legacy.
Without asking GEN Bradley, he planned to cross south of the Rhine Gorge, spurred
forward by the success of his peers. By his own admission, the news of First Army
crossing at Remagen ignited jealousy within him.189 He was determined to play the hero,
and he intentionally acted gregariously to build his reputation.
With all that has been said about LTG Patton, even by himself, it would be
reasonable to assume that he was responsible for the ambitious, if inadvisable, crossing of
the Rhine Gorge.190 However, LTG Patton shockingly does not try to take credit for the
idea. In fact, LTG Patton intended to shift divisions away from the Rhine Gorge to
support the crossings further south. In what was perhaps a play to LTG Patton’s ego,
LTG Middleton suggested an ambitious plan to capture Koblenz with his VIII Corps
rather than transferring troops to XII Corps.191 Koblenz sat on the western bank of the
Rhine River at the northern end of the Rhine Gorge, and LTG Middleton’s plan to
capture it led directly to the subsequent Rhine Gorge crossings by VIII Corps.
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LTG Patton focused all his energy on the Oppenheim crossing, which is reflected
in his memoirs. He sees it as the perfect strategy in the perfect location, describing the
crossing as magnificent and glorious.192 Regarding the Rhine Gorge crossing, LTG
Patton is less magnanimous, referring to LTG Middleton’s plan as an attempt to “force a
crossing in the gorge of the Rhine.”193 Further supporting the theory that LTG Patton was
focused on Oppenheim, he misidentifies the division conducting the Rhine Gorge
crossing at St Goarshausen, claiming it was the 76th ID. Although the 76th ID was located
at St Goar on the western bank of the Rhine, the 89th ID passed through their defensive
positions and conducted the crossing in that location. LTG Patton’s foremost concern is
the poetic significance of crossing the Rhine Gorge near the Lorelei. 194 LTG Patton even
notes that historical studies portrayed the Rhine Gorge as “impassible.”195
Even though the Rhine Gorge crossings were not LTG Patton’s idea, he celebrates
the fact that American forces made it across in that dangerous section of the river. His
willingness to distance himself from the planning while celebrating the tenacity of the
American soldiers who crossed speaks volumes even though he refrains from providing
open criticism. LTG Patton was always looking for recognition, and his fundamental
purpose for writing about the war was establishing his own legacy within the historical
record. If he truly believed that crossing the Rhine Gorge was an effective strategy, he
would not have pushed credit away so willingly—it was not in his nature. On the other
hand, LTG Middleton worked directly for LTG Patton, and it would not have played well
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for LTG Patton’s carefully crafted legacy to criticize him. It was an ambitious plan, and
LTG Patton was the king of ambitious plans, so it had to be praised.
Unlike LTG Patton, LTG Middleton was known for his calm demeanor.196 He did
not seek attention or promote idealistic causes by publishing his own book after the war,
but he was concerned with correcting mistakes he perceived in the World War II
narrative. His combat experience was extensive. As a young lieutenant he participated in
the American invasion of Mexico at Vera Cruz prior to World War I.197 He went on to
serve with distinction during World War I, becoming the youngest colonel in the United
States Army and commanding the 39th IN at Bois de Foret where he revolutionized army
doctrine by using “marching fire,” which consisted of soldiers covering their movement
with rifle fire in order to suppress the enemy and reduce the number of casualties taken
during an assault.198 After the armistice was signed, LTG Middleton was assigned to
occupation duty in Germany along the Rhine River, spending time in Boppard, Remagen,
and Koblenz—all important locations for the Rhine River crossings over two decades
later.199 When he returned to the United States, LTG Middleton, like many other officers,
was reduced to his pre-war rank of captain and began an assignment at the Infantry
School.
Due to his calm demeanor and propensity for academics, LTG Middleton excelled
in the classroom as both a student and an instructor. He spent the next 18 years at the
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Infantry School, the Command and General Staff College, the War College, and
Louisiana State University as a Reserve Officer Training Corps instructor.200 During the
interwar period he had a significant impact on army doctrine because of his positions at
army schools. He wrote much of the cutting edge combined arms doctrine of the period,
which advocated the use of artillery, armor, and aerial support for infantry assaults rather
than masses of men moving on line against fortified defensive positions.201 He also taught
night operations, a new concept intended to protect formations against aerial attack by
using hours of limited visibility.202 In the classroom, LTG Middleton drew heavily from
his experiences in World War I, emphasizing the lessons he learned at Bois de Foret
about the use of covering fire and combined arms warfare.203
When World War II began, LTG Middleton was recalled to active duty, having
retired in 1937.204 He commanded the 45th ID through Africa and into Sicily and Italy.205
As the Allies began preparations for the Normandy invasion, GEN Eisenhower
specifically requested to have LTG Middleton as the commander of VIII Corps even
though he was experiencing health problems.206 LTG Middleton had served alongside
and worked with senior officers like GEN Eisenhower, GEN Bradley, and LTG Patton
for years. He recognized the tension between GEN Bradley and LTG Patton,
understanding that LTG Patton had a tendency to overstep his boundaries and take
tactical control away from GEN Bradley as the Allies assaulted across France.207 LTG
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Middleton seems to have more in common with GEN Bradley, speaking of “the counsel
of caution” and stressing the necessity of methodical operations in combat rather than
rushing to failure.208
As the 12th Army Group approached the Rhine River, GEN Bradley did not want
to outpace his supply system. Conversely, LTG Patton wanted to push as quickly as
possible. LTG Middleton recalls reminding LTG Patton, “how emphatic Bradley was
when he told Patton to remain in place.”209 From LTG Middleton’s perspective, he and
GEN Bradley were strategically placed above and below LTG Patton in the chain of
command as calming advocates for deliberate and well-organized operations. However,
roles reversed at the Rhine River. When LTG Patton planned to take divisions from him
for the Rhine crossing, LTG Middleton resisted the idea with a plan so ambitious even
LTG Patton thought it was too risky. After LTG Middleton proposed taking Koblenz with
VIII Corps, LTG Patton said, “Only a fool would attempt such an operation with so few
troops.”210 Once VIII Corps took Koblenz, LTG Patton instructed them to cross the
Rhine, expecting them to cross north of the Rhine Gorge near their new stronghold at
Koblenz. According to LTG Middleton, LTG Patton was shocked when he revealed that
he intended to cross in the Rhine Gorge instead. LTG Patton said, “Why, man, haven’t
you read your history… you must know that no one has ever crossed the Rhine in that
area.”211 LTG Middleton countered that the Germans would not expect a crossing in the
Rhine Gorge—they would not even bother to defend that area.212
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The specific details of the Rhine Gorge crossings are confused by LTG Middleton
as he recounts them to his biographer. He claims that the 89th ID crossed at Boppard and
the 87th ID crossed at Koblenz facing heavy resistance before sending elements north to
Boppard in order to cross there.213 In reality, the 87th ID conducted the crossing at
Boppard, and the 89th ID attempted to cross at St Goarshausen, not Koblenz, which
makes sense because St Goarshausen was ten miles south of Boppard, the distance and
direction described by LTG Middleton. Adding to the confusion, LTG Middleton
mentions the harassment of snipers at the Lorelei while the 89th ID crossed at Boppard.214
Snipers located on Lorelei would have been ten miles south of Boppard, not even within
eyesight. The 89th ID was harassed by enemy on the Lorelei, but it was heavy cannon fire
from anti-aircraft gun positions—not the ineffective sniper fire described by LTG
Middleton. Overall, LTG Middleton proudly takes credit for the decision to cross the
Rhine Gorge. However, he also provides a confused and inaccurate description of the
events. According to LTG Middleton, “The Eighty-ninth put all its infantry across the
Rhine before daylight, against practically no resistance.”215 In reality, the 89th ID faced
stiff resistance as they crossed, and the majority of the division did not make it across
until the sun rose and supporting artillery and aerial fires suppressed the fortified German
positions.
Although LTG Middleton did not leave behind extensive records, even less
remains of MG Finley. He did not leave behind his own account of World War II, and no
one wrote a biography of him. All that remains are a few references in a handful of
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books, and an obscure research paper written by MG Finley in 1933 when he was a
student at the Command and General Staff College. That paper, titled “A Critical
Analysis of French Night Attacks in the World War,” is extremely relevant to a
discussion of the Rhine Gorge crossing conducted by the 89th ID. In the paper, MG
Finley analyzes night operations during World War I in order to establish guidelines for
successful night attacks. Eleven years after writing that paper, he planned a night attack
to cross the Rhine Gorge.
According to MG Finley, the most important element in a night attack is taking
time to thoroughly reconnoiter enemy positions and develop a detailed plan.216 When
forced to conduct his night attack during World War II, MG Finley failed to account for
the tactical advantage of the defensive positions around St Goarshausen. Another point of
emphasis for MG Finley is the element of surprise. He writes, “When surprise is
complete the attack will generally succeed.”217 Since one of the primary tactical errors of
the Rhine Gorge crossing was the inappropriate attempt to achieve surprise, it is
noteworthy that MG Finley specifically advocates that tactic in an academic paper.
Interestingly, he also acknowledges the benefit of artillery and aerial support, but only if
they do not detract from the element of surprise. He even asserts that tank support is
entirely unnecessary.218 During the Rhine Gorge crossing, the 89th ID failed to achieve
the element of surprise, but also failed to immediately support the soldiers crossing with
all the artillery, aerial, and tank assets available. Perhaps the enablers were not utilized at
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the beginning of the operation because MG Finley was fundamentally concerned with the
element of surprise at the expense of supporting fires.
In his history of the Rhineland Campaign, MacDonald writes that MG Finley did
not want to cross the Rhine Gorge at St Goarshausen. Instead, he wanted to use the
crossing point secured by the 87th ID at Boppard but was unable to do so due to the
congestion there on March 25, just hours after they had completed the crossing.
MacDonald also claims that MG Finley personally procured the naval landing craft used
at Oberwesel by his 353rd IN when he saw how contentious the Rhine Gorge crossing had
become.219 The ultimate success of the 89th ID was due to the use of enablers such as
artillery, aircraft, heavy weapons, and naval landing craft. MG Finley was reticent to
force a crossing at the Rhine Gorge, but when ordered to do so he relied on the strategies
he had developed during his study of World War I night attacks. When those strategies
failed to produce the desired results, he adjusted his approach and used indirect fires to
provide the support his soldiers needed to succeed. The only asset he did not use
extensively to support the crossing was his attached tank unit, which he flexed north to
cross at Boppard rather than using them to engage the enemy at St Goarshausen.220
The only preserved record of MG Finley discussing the events at the Rhine Gorge
is in his introduction for the 89th ID history. He identifies that battle as the single most
important moment for the division during World War II, and portrays it as a valiant and
heroic moment, with no discussion of how it could have been executed differently. He
certainly does not question the necessity of the crossing or undermine the sacrifice of the
soldiers who died by admitting to tactical mistakes. Such a discussion would not be
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appropriate for the official history of the unit. However, it is apparent that the sacrifice of
his soldiers weighed heavily on MG Finley. He asserts, “That is what the Division will
remember longest; its brave men who died in those boats on the Rhine.”221 Although MG
Finley may have had doubts about his tactical decisions guiding the Rhine Gorge
crossings, his official statement on the matter does not reveal any doubt. In committing it
to the historical record, MG Finley provides the same sort of positive assessment his
superiors give—with the only exception being a heartfelt recognition of the lives lost that
day.
The accounts recorded by army leaders about the Rhine Gorge crossings are
certainly not surprising. To expect a detailed and painful recognition of tactical missteps
would be unrealistic, especially within the greater context of World War II. Thousands of
lives were lost during the Rhineland Campaign, and exponentially more throughout the
entire war. The loss of a couple hundred soldiers in a battle was not the type of thing that
drew attention in 1945. Why would a leader draw attention to it himself if no one asked
him to do so? It was easy to justify since the crossing of the Rhine Gorge was ultimately
successful. After the war, generals were attempting to recognize the heroism of their
soldiers, justify the overall cost of the war, and secure their own legacy in the wake of
what was perceived as an overwhelming success. Whatever their individual motives may
have been, all five of the commanding generals responsible for the Rhine Gorge crossings
treat the operation as an unmitigated success, entirely ignoring mistakes.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE
Doubtless, the enemy will be interested to learn just how few forces
defended the Rhine front.
—General der Infanterie Gustav Hoehne222

It is impossible to fully understand any given battle without examining both sides.
The German defenders were quite effective at the Rhine Gorge, but how did they
describe their own positions? Did they consider their actions successful? While it is often
more difficult to find the perspective of the losing side, the United States did an excellent
job of preserving reports captured from the German military. Although some of the
German reports were lost forever during their long retreat and eventual collapse, many of
the accounts of the German defenders in the Rhine Gorge were saved and preserved in
the National Archives. As the German leaders who wrote the reports were not promoting
American exceptionalism, their accounts provide crucial data points absent of any proAmerican perspectives and enable a more critical interpretation of American tactics.
There are three important points regarding the Rhine Gorge crossing that can only
be found through a careful analysis of the German records. First, the total number of
German defenders was relatively small—only 50-75 personnel. Second, the types of
soldiers assigned to that sector were not suited for repelling an attacking American
division. The defense consisted of anti-aircraft and national guard soldiers rather than
infantry or armor. Third, the morale of the defenders could not sustain intense pressure,
in part because the national guard soldiers were known for surrendering quickly to
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advancing American forces. Comparing the true capabilities of the defenders to the
casualties they inflicted provides a much clearer understanding of the true cost for the
Rhine Gorge crossing and reframes that cost in terms of reasonably expected outcomes.
The preserved accounts are fundamental to understanding the German
perspective, but they require context in order to be interpreted correctly. The standard
organization and structure of the German military must be outlined so that the Rhine
Gorge defenders can be contrasted to a typical German unit. In addition, the gradual
degradation of the German military during the later years of World War II must be
reviewed to explain why the Rhine Gorge defense was relatively weak when compared to
prior defensive battles in which the Germans participated. When understood in context,
the German records of the Rhine Gorge tell the story of a dramatically outnumbered and
poorly equipped force mounting a lackluster defense—a story that demands a closer look
into why the American forces struggled as much as they did in crossing the Rhine Gorge.
The largest branch of the German military was the Wehrmacht, which can be
traced back to the German forces of World War I and the preceding Prussian military
traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Because of their relationship to the forces of
World War I, Chris McNab refers to the Wehrmacht in his book, Hitler’s Armies, as “a
phoenix from the ashes.”223 The Wehrmacht was the heart of the German military and
most German soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen belonged to this massive
organization.
Another important branch of the German military was the Schutzstaffel, or as it
was commonly known, the SS. The SS began as a personal protective force for Adolph
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Hitler, but eventually grew into a force capable of conducting independent military
operations. The military arm of the SS was known as the Waffen-SS. For most of its
existence, the Waffen-SS recruited along strict racial lines, promoting the core ideals of
National Socialism, and becoming infamous for war crimes and extensive participation in
the Holocaust.224 Over the years, the reputation of the Waffen-SS has likely expanded
beyond reality, creating a false contrast with the Wehrmacht. For example, author Robert
Citino notes that most scholars agree the Wehrmacht soldiers were almost as fully
indoctrinated into the National Socialist cause as the Waffen-SS.225 However, the
Waffen-SS did represent a large force—900,000 strong at its peak—with a selective
recruiting process resulting in units that were typically more formidable than the average
Wehrmacht equivalent.226 Although the Waffen-SS was distinct from the Wehrmacht, in
many instances Waffen-SS units operated under the control of the Wehrmacht since the
Waffen-SS did not possess equivalent high-level command structures. If a Waffen-SS
unit had been present at the Rhine Gorge when the 89th ID crossed, it would have made
the crossing significantly more difficult, but the SS unit assigned to that sector was
moved before the battle began.
The final branch of the German military that must be discussed was the
Volkssturm. The literal translation of Volkssturm is “the people’s storm.” It represented a
desperate attempt by the Nazi’s to defend the German homeland on both fronts using men
that had been previously exempted from military service due to their age or other
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disqualifying factors.227 In spite of the pressing need for additional troops, Hitler initially
resisted forming the Volkssturm, reasoning that it would signal an attitude of defeat to the
German people and produce lackluster units since the potential soldiers being targeted
had already been passed over for military service.228 However, as the situation worsened
for the Nazi’s, Hitler had little choice but to authorize the formation of the Volkssturm on
September 25, 1944.229 Mobilized separately from the Wehrmacht, the Volkssturm was
advertised as a final, unbreakable “storm” of German militarism that would protect the
German culture and race from annihilation at the hands of lesser people—especially the
Russian Soviets.230 Although there were some limited victories on the Eastern Front
against the Soviets, the Volkssturm was largely unsuccessful, with these hastily formed
units surrendering quickly under the stress of combat or, occasionally, without even
engaging in combat prior to surrender.231 Their presence at the Rhine Gorge did little to
aid the Germans in defending that terrain.
In addition to the distinct organizations of the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, and
Volkssturm, the German military was divided into different types of units. For example,
the Luftwaffe, or German Air Force, was a subset of the Wehrmacht. Most ground forces
belonged to the Heer, or Army, but there were a few that belonged to the Luftwaffe. One
type of ground force belonging to the Luftwaffe that factored heavily into the defense of
the Rhine Gorge was the Flak Defense Unit. Flak units consisted of radar men,
communication specialists, searchlight operators, and anti-aircraft gun teams. The Flak
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units were only ground forces in the sense that they did not fly. Although they operated
on the ground, their focus was the air. They were specifically designed to defeat Allied
aerial attacks against Germany, but by the end of the war they were instructed to hold
defensive positions against ground attacks in addition to their primary mission of
defeating enemy bombers.232 Although their guns were certainly effective against
wooden boats, Flak units were not properly manned, equipped, or trained for the kind of
prolonged close combat that occurred at the Rhine Gorge.
Other types of units found within the German military included infantry, artillery,
engineers, armor, mountain, and anti-tank units. Such subdivisions existed within the
Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, and Volkssturm. In addition to knowing the large organization
to which they belonged, knowing the specific type of unit involved provides valuable
insight into how they could be expected to perform. For example, a group of Waffen-SS
infantrymen would typically be most successful in close combat against dismounted
ground forces in thickly forested areas or complex urban environments. Wehrmacht tanks
were overwhelmingly successful when matched against Allied tanks or dismounted
forces in open areas. Volkssturm units struggled mightily unless they were facing the
dreaded onslaught of Soviets, at which point they fought bravely even if they were
largely ineffective. Most importantly, support units such as the artillery and anti-aircraft
(Flak) were not equipped or trained for direct combat such as was seen in the Rhine
Gorge. They were meant to assist the infantry and armor units by providing additional
firepower while those other units maneuvered on their enemy and engaged in close
combat.
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Considering the German military structure, there are multiple reasons the
defenders at the Rhine Gorge were unfit for their task. Foremost, the bedrock of the
defense was a small Flak unit, designed for aerial defense rather than ground defense.
The Flak unit was then supplemented with Volkssturm soldiers who had been deemed
incapable of military service until their country became desperate enough to recruit them.
These soldiers were also not infantry soldiers, but rather military police.
The structure of the German military is not the only variable that must be
considered when discussing World War II—the effect of time was critical. The German
military was dramatically different at the end of the war. In fact, the German military
grew and shrank throughout the war due to losses and mobilizations; additionally, the
quality of equipment and training varied widely over time. For the first two years of the
war, the Germans faced relatively little resistance and continued to expand and grow
stronger in preparation for future operations.233 The last five years of the war saw a
steady decline for the German military as they faced struggles on multiple fronts against
several opponents and transitioned from offensive campaigns to defensive operations.234
It was this weakened German military that the 89th ID soldiers encountered when they
crossed the Rhine Gorge.
By the end of 1944, the Germans were quickly retreating along three fronts, even
as they continued to inflict damage on their enemies. As he prepared to defend against the
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impending Allied invasion of Western Europe, the senior commander General Jodl noted
that there were 280 divisions remaining in the German military in 1944. However, with
25 in the Balkans, 12 in Norway, 27 in Italy, and 156 on the Eastern Front fighting
Russia, that left only 60 divisions to repel the Allies. Of those 60 divisions, General Jodl
estimated that only 30 were ready for combat.235 Beginning with the Allied invasion at
Normandy, the already weakened German military declined more rapidly, particularly
due to the Ardennes Offensive and Operation Nordwind—two failed offensive
operations.236 The serious losses of late 1944 meant that fewer soldiers had to cover
larger sectors, which would factor directly into the small number of troops assigned to the
Rhine Gorge. Additionally, the long retreats across continents and failed offensives had
taken a toll on the morale of the Germans, meaning they were more likely to surrender
quickly when facing a strong attacking force.
As the German military retreated across the Rhine River in 1945, they established
defenses, attempting to use that strategic terrain to repel the Allied advance into
Germany. However, Operation Nordwind had seriously degraded the units responsible
for the Upper Rhine. The defense of the Rhine Gorge, specifically, fell to the LXXXIX
Army Corps, commanded by General Gustav Hoehne. The LXXXIX Army Corps was a
relatively new unit within the German military, founded in late 1942 as the losses in
Russia and Africa mounted. The unit saw little combat as it was stationed in Belgium,
comprised of a revolving series of reserve divisions and soldiers rotating away from
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sectors like the Eastern Front. The LXXXIX Corps was moved out of Belgium in
November, prior to the Battle of the Bulge, then assigned to the Saar region where the
unprepared troops were thrust headlong into Operation Nordwind, suffering over 2,500
casualties within the first week of fighting.237 By the time the LXXXIX Corps was
assigned to the defense of the Rhine Gorge, it only had two divisions remaining: the 276th
Volksgrenadier Division (276th VG) and the 6th SS Mountain Division (6th SS).
The positions occupied by the LXXXIX Corps were initially created by the Von
Berg Division, an element of Volkssturm soldiers recruited in the Rhine Gorge area and

Figure Eleven: German Deployment Along Rhine Gorge
serving as a National Guard force of sorts. Although it was labeled a division, the
Volkssturm unit consisted of only two military police companies, totaling perhaps 200
personnel for the entire Rhine Gorge. As Volkssturm rather than Wehrmacht or SS, and

237

William T. McCroden and Thomas E. Nutter, German Ground Forces of World War II (El Dorado
Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2019), 322-323; Zaloga, Operation Nordwind 1945, 49.

105

as military police rather than infantry or armor the Von Berg division was doubly unfit to
mount a serious defense in the Rhine Gorge.
GEN Hoehne divided his sector at the town of Boppard, placing the 276th VG in
the north and the 6th SS in the south.238 (Figure Eleven) Like the Von Berg Division, the
276th VG was a misnomer, since their strength in late March was little more than 400
men.239 The northernmost boundary of the LXXXIX Corps was the town of Niederberg,
which sat on the east side of the Rhine River across from Koblenz.
The German military decided to strongpoint the key city of Koblenz, even though
it sat on the west side of the Rhine, obligating General Hoehne to commit over half of the
276th VG to that city. Adjacent units contributed to the Koblenz defense, totaling 1,800
men, but when the Allied forces commanded by LTG Middleton took Koblenz on March
19, only about 50 of those German defenders made it across the Rhine, leaving an already
depleted 276th VG in a precarious position. Even with his reduced force, GEN Hoehne
assessed that it would be possible to defend the Rhine Gorge with remnants of the 276th
VG in the north and the relatively strong 6th SS in the south. Unfortunately for GEN
Hoehne, the 6th SS was taken from him on March 21 to serve as a reserve element to the
east, leaving the southern sector of the Rhine Gorge without any infantry protecting it and
making a defense there practically impossible.240
The withdrawal of the 6th SS from the Rhine Gorge meant the section where the
89th ID would cross fell under the command of the 19th Flak Brigade, the anti-aircraft unit
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responsible for defending that region of Germany against Allied aerial raids.241 Like other
German units, the 19th Flak Brigade was severely undermanned and underequipped by
March of 1945. GEN Hoehne notes that only the light anti-aircraft guns could be used in
the Rhine Gorge, which would have primarily been the commonly used FlaK 30, a 20mm
single gun system that was originally intended to be a place holder until the Flakvierling
38 could be fielded, which was an improved system combining four guns into a single
weapon for an increased rate of fire.242 The heavy anti-aircraft weapons were useless in
the steep terrain of the Rhine Gorge due to their trajectory, so they were held further back
and used only for anti-aircraft fires. The few remaining FlaK 30s and Flakvierling 38s
were emplaced at key points along the ridges but had to be fired from exposed positions
in order to effectively engage ground forces attempting to cross the Rhine. The only
soldiers available to reinforce the 19th Flak Brigade were small contingents of military
police from the Von Berg Division, who GEN Hoehne refers to as having “no fighting
value whatsoever.”243 So, as the American forces approached, the towns of Wellmich, St
Goarshausen, and Oberwesel were defended by ineffective soldiers and anti-aircraft guns.
With careful analysis of the historical context and the relevant details
communicated by GEN Hoehne, it is possible to reliably estimate the size and quality of
the force defending the Rhine Gorge. Accurately assessing the German defense is crucial
because doing so enables the extrapolation of reasonable outcomes for the Rhine Gorge
crossing. In other words, it reveals how many casualties the German forces should have
been able to inflict on the 89th ID. Although it is admittedly speculative by nature,
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projecting what the German defenders should have been able to accomplish is critical to
developing a truly wholistic estimate of the cost suffered by the Americans. If the
Germans should have been able to inflict thousands of casualties based on the men and
equipment available, it would indicate the American attackers conducted an efficient and
entirely successful operation. Contrarily, if the Germans should have failed to even slow
down a fully equipped American task force, it would dramatically reframe the
significance of the casualties they inflicted.
Assessing the German defense is difficult, but not impossible. The records from
the Von Berg Division do not mention the Rhine Gorge battle, indicating that the
Volkssturm soldiers only had a minor role in the fighting.244 The records of the 276th VG
indicate that the 19th Flak Brigade was likely arrayed in about four defensive positions
around towns on the eastern bank, with between four and eight FlaK 30s or Flakvierling
38s at any given location.245 American POW records reveal that the total number of
German defenders for the Rhine Gorge was less than 200 soldiers, with a little over 50
defenders at each location.246 Therefore, the detachment of anti-aircraft crew members
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with assorted Volkssturm soldiers defending St Goarshausen consisted of 50-75 Germans
manning 6-10 light anti-aircraft guns. Oberwesel and Wellmich were likely defended by
fewer Germans, since they are not even mentioned in the reports. No infantrymen
participated, no artillery was allocated specifically to the defenders, and no armored
vehicles were available. Some of the German soldiers were untrained recruits who had
previously been barred from joining the military. The anti-aircraft soldiers were trained to
shoot airplanes—not engage ground forces and hold terrain. All these factors indicate that
German forces should have only been able to inflict a relatively small number of
casualties. The fact that such depleted units were able to impose substantial losses on the
89th ID is further evidence of operational missteps on the part of the American military.
Assessing the American forces is much easier due to the available records. At
well over 10,000 soldiers, the 89th ID was at least 50 times bigger than the German force
defending the Rhine Gorge. The 89th ID also had 304 artillery pieces, two attached
armored battalions, and aerial cover from the XIX Tactical Air Command supporting
their operation.247 Additionally, the soldiers of the 89th ID were fresh and ready for
combat while the German defenders were weary from years of fighting. The only
significant advantage the Germans had was terrain, but American forces had the enablers
needed to reach across the river and mitigate the German advantage using high-caliber
direct fire weapons, artillery, and air power. After comparing all the factors and assessing
both sides, it is completely reasonable to say that the Americans could have defeated the
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Germans without losing more than 20 men.248 Undoubtedly, if the Americans had not
made themselves so vulnerable while crossing the Rhine Gorge, they could have easily
broken the German defense without losing many soldiers. As it was, the Germans
inflicted over 250 casualties—more than 50 casualties than there were defenders. The
Americans lost over 10 times the number of men than would have been reasonably
expected. It is only in those terms that the true cost of the Rhine Gorge is revealed.
At face value, the numbers indicate an overwhelming advantage for American
forces; a closer look demonstrates that the situation was even more bleak for the Germans
than the numbers alone say. The German records do not provide a detailed account of
what happened during the Allied crossing of the Rhine Gorge—in fact, they have hardly
any details at all. After discussing how they set in the defenses, the reports simply say
where the Allies crossed. Such little information is not surprising. The German soldiers
who experienced the battle first-hand were killed or captured, and their accounts did not
make it back to their superiors.
Ultimately, the Germans were categorically defeated at the Rhine Gorge, but
given the state of their units, their defeat was entirely predictable. The value of the
German perspective lies in their detailed account of just how minimal the defenses were
along the Rhine Gorge—a perspective that was entirely overlooked in American
accounts. To their credit, the few German soldiers remaining in the area did organize a
relatively impressive resistance, but given the state of their forces, the amount of damage
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inflicted on the Americans is truly astounding. The German perspective serves to
undermine the narrative of American exceptionalism that pervades the original narrative
of World War II generally and the Rhine Gorge specifically.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS
As we walked back to the starting point, I could see what had happened
to the boats that preceded us. The shore was covered with human
bodies, arms, legs, and human flesh was evident along the shoreline.
This was a horrible, ghastly fight.
—SGT Clarence Petoske249

A great deal can be learned from the historical records of the Rhine Gorge
crossing that have been preserved by the United States government. Those records
provide a treasure trove of reliable facts—timetables, unit positions, casualty numbers,
operational orders, etc. The National Archives have even preserved German military
records, enabling historians to look at the battle from both sides of the Rhine. However,
the preserved military records leave out one of the most important perspectives: the
American soldiers who were on the ground and in the boats crossing the Rhine Gorge. So
where can that perspective be found? Scattered bits and pieces, traces of an event long
ignored, can be recovered from the edges of history in the form of short accounts written
in newsletters or posted online for fellow veterans as well as obscure articles that were
never widely read. The soldier perspective is the most valuable group of sources for
reshaping the Rhine Gorge narrative for two basic reasons: it is the only collection of
eye-witness accounts available and it has not yet been incorporated into a wholistic
historical analysis of the battle.
The value of soldier accounts does not negate the serious limitations involved
with using them to reshape the narrative. They are the most contradictory and unreliable
sources available, even though they still have much to offer researchers. Some soldiers
make claims that are clearly inaccurate when compared to other accounts and the unit
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records. Inaccuracy is inevitable considering many wrote their stories decades later. Time
can alter even the most distinct memories, and veterans certainly read the histories
available to them and compared memories with fellow veterans over the years, distorting
their own thoughts about the events they witnessed. Soldiers also saw the Cold War
unfolding around them, and their feelings about current events could have galvanized
their political sensibilities and distorted their memories. Additionally, humans have a
proclivity for sensationalism, and war stories are by no means immune from that natural
tendency. Sharing a war story online, in a newsletter, or in a magazine presents a unique
opportunity to garner the appreciation of others by overstating experiences.
Consequently, recreating a minute-by-minute record of everything that happened during
the battle is not possible using their accounts, but carefully reading their stories reveals
unmistakable trends and patterns.
The feeling and tone of veterans’ stories is completely different than that of the
original narrative crafted by leaders, journalists, and historians working for the War
Department. Rather than simply celebrating the power of the American military, the
individual testimonies of veterans leave an impression of immense tragedy and poor
planning by senior leaders. The memories communicated by veterans represent the most
significant elements of the story for them. Even seemingly inconsequential details should
be taken seriously, especially when multiple people mention similar specifics.
The surviving soldier accounts of the Rhine Gorge crossing consist of a wide
variety of individual perspectives recorded for distinct purposes. Oscar Friedensohn
managed to have his account published in a couple of short periodicals. Paul Brown
wrote a detailed analysis of the battle for one of his army schools. Donald Chase, Robert
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Gallagher, and Murray Coffey posted their memoirs online. Several men wrote down
their memories for inclusion in “The Rolling W,” a magazine edition printed ahead of an
89th ID reunion in 1994 and distributed to veterans of the unit. Finally, a few soldiers sent
their stories to the 89th ID website where they were posted for fellow veterans and family
members to see.
In total, there are almost thirty first-hand accounts written by American soldiers
that participated in the Rhine Gorge crossing whose identities can be confirmed using the
rosters preserved by the 89th ID or other military records. The accounts range from short
paragraphs to book-length memoirs. The individual perspectives vary from infantrymen
crossing in the initial wave to support soldiers watching the entire battle from the
ridgeline. The highest-ranking soldier was a captain serving as a company commander,
and the lowest ranking was a private serving as a rifleman. The details in the personal
accounts often vary, based on each specific perspective. Since the accounts are
incomplete and the reliability of individual soldiers is difficult to establish without having
much background information on them, the only effective way to leverage their stories is
to identify trends, thereby consolidating them into a unified perspective.
The first trend from veteran accounts is a communicated feeling of impending
doom felt as they prepared for the attack. For example, First Lieutenant (1LT) Jim
Connell begins his story by mentioning that the phrase “see the Rhine and die” was
painted all over the buildings on the west side of the Rhine Gorge.250 The phrase must
have been prevalent in Oberwesel, because PFC Ed Quick also mentions seeing a crudely
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painted skull and crossbones with the slogan “see the Rhine and leave your skull
there.”251 The signs made a lasting impression.
In addition to the signs written on walls, several soldiers specifically remember
receiving a hot meal before the attack, which they interpreted as a bad omen. PFC Robert
Gallagher and Captain (CPT) Paul Brown mention the hot meal without going into detail
about the significance of it.252 The recurrence of otherwise insignificant facts like
receiving a hot meal say a lot about how people felt. PFC Phillip Leveque explains the
feelings that accompanied a hot meal: “We were told that we were going to have Class A
rations (cooked by the company mess sergeants) for supper. This was ominous as hell
itself, as we hadn’t had Class A food for weeks.”253 Putting it more bluntly, PFC Lester
Becker says of the hot meal, “I think they figured it would probably be the last one for
many of us.”254 The feeling of impending tragedy communicated years later by veterans
could be a product of hindsight with the results of the battle creating the memory of that
feeling, but even that would be significant because the historical records do not feature a
sense of tragedy or doom at all. Regardless of when those feelings manifested, they
represent a divergence from the original narrative.
Contributing to the ominous mood of the veteran accounts, many of them describe
the difficult terrain in the Rhine Gorge. Demonstrating an awareness of the mythology
born in that region, three veterans speak of the Lorelei who had supposedly lured sailors

251

Ed Quick, “Rhine Crossing,” 89th Infantry Division of World War II, November 18, 2001.
Robert F. Gallagher, “World War II Story: Scratch One Messerschmitt,” Gallagher Story; Paul J.
Brown, “Operations of Company A, 354th Infantry Regiment, 89th Division, in the Rhine crossing at
Wellmich, Germany, 25-26 March 1945” (1947-1948), Infantry School Student Papers, in the MCoE
Libraries Digital Collection, 6.
253
Phillip Leveque, “Rhine Stories,” The Rolling W vol. 4, no. 37 (Apr. 1994): 10.
254
Lester L. Becker, “Rhine Stories,” The Rolling W vol. 4, no. 37 (Apr. 1994): 7.
252

115

to their deaths in the Rhine Gorge for centuries.255 Admittedly, it is unlikely they knew of
the Lorelei connection until after the war, or at least after the battle, but their connection
to that myth is likely tied to difficult personal experiences with the terrain. Many others
simply note the rough landscape that inspired those myths, such as Sergeant (SGT)
Harold Mathews who says little about the crossing, focusing almost entirely on the
struggle he had moving up the east bank at Oberwesel. “The bank was very high, nearly
vertical and terraced with grape vineyards making our climb very difficult.”256 PFC Eric
Leiseroff, who also crossed at Oberwesel, does not go into as much detail, simply
exclaiming, “On the other side it was all mountains!”257 The steep slopes on the far side
of the Rhine Gorge were not forgotten.
CPT Brown focuses on the strategic aspects of the terrain in his account, noting
that it heavily favored the enemy with steep banks and a fast current of icy water flowing
from the Alps.258 Taking his analysis even further, PFC James Jochen states that the
terrible location for a crossing was even worse due to the spring thaw which swelled the
river and made the current more dangerous than usual.259 There is no way PFC Jochen
could have known what that section usually looked like, but there is no reason to doubt
that the fast current made a distinct impression. In fact, the swift current is one of the
most mentioned details in the Rhine Gorge accounts.260 CPT Brown’s understated
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assessment at the end of his essay, “In my opinion a better crossing site could have been
selected,” is echoed throughout the veteran narratives.261 Although senior leaders
passively acknowledged the difficult terrain, it is only in the accounts of participating
soldiers that the full impact is found. Their accounts of the river conditions are
corroborated by the mythological traditions and ubiquitous news articles describing the
Rhine Gorge that have already been examined.
As the soldiers of the 89th ID prepared to attack the difficult terrain of the Rhine
Gorge, another prevalent feeling was that of confusion as they rushed through last minute
planning. There is always confusion during operational planning, but many soldiers noted
an exceptional lack of information leading up to this river crossing. PFC Elmer Herbaly
writes that he did not even know where he was as they prepared to cross the Rhine
River.262 Corroborating his account, PFC Leveque states that junior soldiers never knew
where they were, and that their leaders intentionally never told them; however, at the
Rhine Gorge the unknown was particularly frightening, and he admits, “I was scared to
death.”263 More than one soldier indicates that they had no idea Allied forces had already
crossed the Rhine River—they thought they would be the first troops to enter the
heartland of Germany.264
Interpreting the confusion of soldiers presents two problems. First, their confusion
could have been a more personal issue than they realized. The fact that they knew little
about their situation is not necessarily indicative of widespread confusion. Second,
admitted confusion is not consistent with some of the other details they claim to recall
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vividly, meaning they were either not actually that confused or some of their details were
invented or came from other sources rather than their own memories. The reliable
perspective that can be found by consolidating the stories is that preparation at the lowest
levels was rushed, which would reflect poorly on the abilities of company, battalion, and
regimental headquarters to publish timely plans. This perspective is conspicuously
missing from the official records. The generals responsible for the Rhine Gorge crossing
made no mention of rushed planning, but it is likely that this facet of the operation was
completely transparent to them. Their knowledge would have been limited to what the
battalions and regiments reported since they did not personally observe the crossing.
Conversely, veterans with more rank indicate that they had a decent grasp on the
situation prior to launching the attack, which supports the conclusion that the plans were
not properly disseminated to the lowest levels. 1LT George Pusey states that the Rhine
Gorge crossing was the only time he received a formal attack plan during World War II;
but even he admits that the plan was changing significantly as they made their
preparations for the crossing.265 Since the division and regimental plans seem to have
remained the same, some of the blame for last minute changes and confusion should fall
on leaders like LT Pusey and his immediate supervisor for failing to provide sufficient
clarity to their soldiers.
CPT Brown notes that 2-354th IN did not issue the battalion operations order until
2400, just two hours before the attack initiated. By the time he returned from the order,
his company had to begin moving down to the launching point. CPT Brown tried to brief
his platoon leaders individually as they moved through the darkness—being so rushed it
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is unlikely the plan filtered down farther than that. As they began loading boats no one
knew where to go or which boat to get in, so leaders randomly assigned soldiers to boats.
However, leaders like CPT Brown could have anticipated the delay from battalion and
created their own load plans or at least basic movement coordination. After all, they had
known for several hours that they would cross the river, even if they did not have the
official order.
Despite any personal culpability overlooked by leaders like LT Pusey and CPT
Brown, the plan was certainly published too late by the battalions. There definitely was a
clear division plan for crossing the Rhine Gorge; the 89th ID official history has the
division operations order published in totality for posterity. However, most of the soldiers
loading the boats that night had no idea what that plan was.266 Leaders at all levels were
responsible for that confusion.
Another trend in the veteran accounts about the Rhine Gorge crossing is the use of
supporting assets such as artillery and smoke (or lack thereof) to assist in the operation.
At first glance, this topic is difficult to interpret because the stories seem to conflict, with
some claiming that they were used extensively and other stating that they were not used
effectively at all. There are two principles that can be used to clarify the matter. First, the
individual accounts are often based on impressions and individual perspectives, meaning
that two people could hear or see the same incident and still provide varying assessments.
Second, for artillery there is a difference between preparatory fires and covering fires.
Preparatory fires take place before an objective is attacked in order to destroy or displace
the enemy, while covering fires take place during an attack in order to prevent the enemy
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from engaging friendly elements as they move closer. By looking closely at soldier
accounts to identify the timing of the artillery fire they heard or saw, it is possible to
determine if they witnessed preparatory fires or covering fires. Preparatory fires would
have been much less effective than covering fires for a river crossing.
From the veterans’ stories available, six different soldiers specifically mention
hearing or seeing extensive American artillery fire across the river before the attack
began.267 PVT Friedensohn, on the other hand, takes issue with the idea that the artillery
fire was extensive, stating “I remember sporadic shells at what seemed like random
intervals.”268 Regardless of the intensity or whether the soldiers knew their purpose, all of
these artillery missions were preparatory fires, executed long before the crossings began.
CPT Brown clearly remembers requesting that additional preparatory fires be conducted
immediately prior to the assault to make them more effective, but his request was
denied.269 Because the preparatory fires were executed long before the attack and the
enemy occupied fortified positions with cover, their effect would have been minimal.
CPT Brown’s requested preparatory fires may have been more effective than
those conducted, but covering fires would have done the most to protect the soldiers
crossing that night. As PFC Herbaly notes about the moment of crossing, “There was to
be no artillery, so we were on our own in securing a foothold.”270 Rather than being a
purely hypothetical point, the testimony of SGT Clarence Petoske who crossed after the
Americans began using covering fires during the day demonstrates conclusively how
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much of a difference artillery would have made during the initial attempts: “I think all
our boats made it across without being shot at. I guess the reason we were so successful
in crossing was that our artillery had laid down a tremendous barrage of fire.”271 The
failure to leverage artillery to cover the first waves during the night certainly contributed
to the number of American casualties sustained.
In addition to artillery fire, another asset that was often used to support
maneuvering troops was smoke, which could be provided by mortars or smoke
generators. Technician Fifth Grade (TEC5) Cornelius Woodard and PFC Sol Brandell
both remember smoke generators being used, but the wind was blowing in the wrong
direction, making them completely useless.272 CPT Brown recognized the need for
effective smoke when his soldiers took contact in the middle of the river. Acting quickly,
he grabbed his radio and called in smoke from the only asset available to him: 81mm
mortars. Smoke rounds from mortars were white phosphorus shells, which exploded into
fragments of incredibly hot metal while creating a thick cloud of smoke. However,
mortars are an area weapon system and need to be adjusted onto a target through a
process of firing rounds with an observer calling in corrections to the gun crews. Since
the mortars were not already adjusted onto a target on the far bank, CPT Brown’s request
resulted in three rounds being fired, with two of them impacting on the American side of
the river. Due to the danger of deadly white phosphorus rounds landing on his own
troops, CPT Brown had to immediately call for a cease fire on smoke rounds, leaving his
men without any concealment as they struggled across the river.273
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The reason for not using covering artillery fires or adjusting smoke targets onto
the far side prior to the assault was simple, if misguided. The plan was to execute a
surprise infiltration across the river and catch the enemy off guard.274 Unfortunately, it
was clear that the Americans intended to cross the Rhine, even if the exact time was
unknown. The massive buildup of troops and the harassing preparatory fires would have
had the Germans on constant high alert. As CPT Brown writes, “In my opinion, there is
no such thing as a secret crossing of a river.”275 SGT Murray Coffey notes in his memoirs
that after he made it across in the initial wave, his group received word to stay under
cover while tanks and artillery engaged the enemy from west of the river. After
witnessing the success of those fires, he decided that they should have done that from the
beginning rather than attempting to sneak across the Rhine Gorge.276
Another one of the most discussed aspects of the Rhine crossing is the type of
boat used, resulting in two dramatically different experiences. Those that used the
wooden assault boats typically relate tragic memories. 1LT Connell remembers one his
soldiers, PFC Harold Lannom, being shot in the head so close to him that teeth fragments
struck 1LT Connell’s cheek. They were vulnerable in the middle of the river and paddled
furiously to reach the other side.277 PFC Herbaly almost drowned when his boat capsized,
not due to enemy fire, but simply because it could not handle the weight of the
passengers in the fast current.278 Whoever was responsible for incorporating the small
wooden boats did not understand how difficult it would be to move across the powerful
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current—especially under enemy fire. The plan had incorporated a crew of two or three
engineers with each boat who were supposed to return to the west bank in order to pick
up more soldiers.279 PFC Gallagher observed from the west ridgeline as the initial wave
struggled across the river. Once they reached the far side, not a single boat dared to
attempt a return trip.280 Their decision to remain on the east side was not a sign of
cowardice. As PFC Jochen notes, the assault boats were agonizingly slow and made easy
targets for the German defenders.281 Attempting a return trip would have been foolhardy.
The soldiers who crossed later using motorized assault boats and naval DUKWs
had an entirely different experience. PFC Becker and PFC Quick both crossed quickly
with no incident at Oberwesel.282 PFC Leonard Waldner saw one DUKW capsize, but
only because it was loaded down with a 105mm howitzer cannon.283 PVT Friedensohn
witnessed the stark contrast between the assault boats and powered boats firsthand. He
was severely wounded while crossing in a wooden boat. After making it to the east side,
he faded in and out of consciousness for hours until he was picked up by soldiers in a
powered boat and evacuated to receive medical care. They were engaged by enemy
machine guns on the way back, but the boat remained untouched because the Germans
were unable to hit such a quick target.284 Like the lack of artillery support, the use of
wooden boats was intended to surprise the German defenders. Leaders assessed that
powered boats would simply be too loud. The amount of paddled boats readily available
likely factored into the decision as well.
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The most prevalent trend in the stories recorded by veterans of the Rhine Gorge
crossing is undoubtedly the nightmare that erupted when the first wave of soldiers
reached the middle of the river. In order to frame and understand some of the differences
in their narratives, they can be divided according to location. As has been stated, there
were three crossing locations for the 89th ID: Oberwesel, Wellmich, and St Goarshausen.
Based on time and location, the stories range from unsettling to utterly terrifying.
The mildest location was Oberwesel, where the 353rd IN crossed. There were
likely fewer defenders in that location, and the 353rd IN managed to get scouting parties
across without taking any contact from the enemy. PFC Leiseroff recalls crossing with
three or four other E Co soldiers before the unit attempted any large-scale operations. As
they patrolled the east side, they came under direct fire from the Germans.285 An E Co
soldier who crossed with the first large wave, PFC Becker, notes that most of the fortified
German defensive positions had already been destroyed by the scouting parties, but they
did still receive machine gun fire and enemy artillery fire as they crossed.286 PFC
Waldner from the regimental cannon company echoes PFC Becker’s statement,
emphasizing the important role of those initial scouting parties.287 Without diminishing
the actions of the small patrols who cleared the way, it is worth noting that the number of
German positions in that area must have been significantly lower than the other two sites
considering how effectively the Americans were able to neutralize the defensive
positions. As successful as the crossing at Oberwesel was, it was not without cost. TEC5
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Matt Landers was with the first wave of DUKWs crossing at Oberwesel and remembers
one of those boats being hit by enemy fire as it pushed away from the western bank.288
At the northernmost crossing point of Wellmich, the soldiers were not as
fortunate. The 354th IN also planned to send a small patrol across before the first big
wave of soldiers, and around 0130 CPT Brown received a report from MAJ Willis, the 1354th IN executive officer, that the B Co squad chosen for that task had made it safely to
the far side.289 PFC Donald Robertson was a member of the scouting element, and he
remembers making it across without the enemy firing a single shot, but unlike the scouts
at Oberwesel, his squad did not engage any Germans once they made it across. They
watched the main body follow them halfway across the river, at which point “all hell
broke loose.”290
The soldiers he saw in the river were from CPT Brown’s A Co. The 2nd PLT had
just pushed away from the shore when the shooting started, and most of them were able
to scramble back to the west bank, although some of them drowned before they could
make it back.291 Since the first boats had no choice but to continue to the other side, A Co
was split in half, with the commander and first sergeant on the west bank unable to
contact or help their soldiers on the far side. Since the assault boats did not return, CPT
Brown and the rest of his company were unable to make it across the river until 0500, a
full three hours later, when motorized boats were brought down to the west bank.292 From
A Co alone, the chaos in the Rhine Gorge resulted in 19 soldiers killed, 23 wounded, and
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4 more taken prisoner.293 It is difficult to calculate how many casualties were sustained
by the other companies or the engineers and other enablers who participated. However,
Wellmich clearly took a heavy toll on the soldiers who crossed there.
As terrible as the experience at Wellmich was, the situation at St Goarshausen
was even more horrific. Two companies, E Co and F Co initiated their crossing of the
Rhine Gorge simultaneously. From his position downstream, CPT Brown heard the
maelstrom erupting as his own soldiers loaded into boats. “As the head of the second
Platoon started down the bank, intense firing started on our right flank.”294 The soldiers
of 2nd PLT, E Co struggled through the chaos. The platoon leader, 1LT George Pusey,
describes the scene in his boat: “Raleigh had a paddle shot out of his hand—the splinters
hit Wingert in the face. It seemed like shells were in our clothing.”295 Staff Sergeant
(SSG) Raleigh Bowling, the squad leader whose paddle was shattered, later stated,
“When we were crossing, I didn’t think any of us would make it.”296 One of the soldiers
from 2nd PLT, PFC William Carver, claims that only 11 of members of his platoon made
it to the other side.297 PVT Friedensohn, the engineer who would later write extensively
about the horrors of the crossing, was one of the soldiers responsible for transporting E
Co. He provides a chilling account of how his boat was ravaged by one of the German
anit-aircraft guns.
Seconds after the explosive force ripped into us, an unworldly silence covered the boat.
The firing continued, along with the deadly lightsreams. We barely heard the noise—it
came from a distant world. Our world had shrunk once again to the few still left aboard
this small boat. Others had been blown over the sides by the force of the 20mm fire. I
found myself amid an unmoving tangle of arms, legs and bodies in the bottom of the
boat.
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The 1st PLT from E Co reached the other side with similar numbers remaining. The other
platoon, 3rd PLT, was unable to push through the firestorm; the current pushed them
downstream where the survivors linked up with A Co and participated in the Wellmich
assault once motorized boats were available.298
Few first-hand records survive from F Co, but Technical Sergeant (T/SGT) Colby
LaPlace from the reserve company that followed later in the day reports that F Co faced
the brunt of the slaughter. As the attack proceeded, he heard that only 15 men from the
initial push by F Co made it to the other side.299 Thankfully, LaPlace’s report did not
mean that the rest of the company had been killed. Like A Co at Wellmich, the remainder
of F Co who were able to stop movement when the firing began had to wait until
daybreak to make another push. Their crossing was covered by a smoke screen and
covering fire from the cannon company.300 The exact number of casualties sustained by F
Co is difficult to assess. Accountability reports for the days that followed reveal the
chaotic nature of the attack. It took days for some soldiers to be reported as casualties.
Based on the influx of replacement soldiers and the somewhat unreliable reporting of the
company, at least 40 soldiers were either killed or severely wounded during the
crossing.301
Although relatively accurate losses can be deciphered for the 353rd IN and the
354th IN, the total number of casualties can only be estimated since there were so many
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supporting personnel from other units who were never systematically calculated.
Apparently, no one ever wanted to know the full cost of crossing the Rhine Gorge. SGT
Coffey claims that around 1,000 men were killed, wounded, or missing in action.302 His
claim is demonstrably inaccurate since a conservative estimate for casualties is 259 and
any number over 400 is sensationalistic.303 While SGT Coffey and the other soldiers
cannot be trusted to determine the true number of casualties, the feelings communicated
by the veterans stranded in the middle of the firestorm are clear. Although memories of
feelings are subject to the distortions of time, the overwhelming consistency across the
individual stories allows for the distillation of a reliable generalized soldier perspective.
From his perch on the ridgeline, PFC Gallagher watched and listened as the battle
unfolded. He notes, “The fighting continued on throughout the night in the valley and the
noise varied from loud to deafening.”304 The carnage in the middle of the river was
forever seared in the memories of the men who were at the Rhine Gorge that night, even
if the specifics of that carnage where distorted in unique ways for each veteran.
Although not as prevalent as other trends in the veteran accounts, two of the most
detailed sources emphasize the crucial role of American armored vehicles in allowing the
units crossing to overcome the German defenses during the day. CPT Brown, whose
narrative was composed only three years after the events occurred, provides an excellent
analysis of the tactical advantage tank destroyers provided.
At 1035, two tank destroyers appeared across the river. With the tank destroyers buttoned
up, they continually ran up and down the road behind the stone building, stopping every
few seconds and firing at the 20mm positions on my flanks. This firing made my
company nervous as we hung to the side of the rocky hill. The TD's fire silenced several
20mm positions. One could see the 20mm tracers glancing off the tank destroyers.305
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The motorized boats had enabled CPT Brown to ferry the remainder of his company
across the Rhine, but the other companies crossing at Wellmich were still pinned down
by the German anti-aircraft guns. Additionally, CPT Brown’s company was unable to
break out of their small beach head without reinforcements from the rest of the battalion.
The tank destroyers were attached to the 354th IN for the Rhine Gorge mission,
but they were not employed at Wellmich until the late morning. The German 20mm antiaircraft guns were designed to shoot high into the sky and destroy unarmored World War
II era airplanes. Although they were incredibly effective against wooden boats, they were
unable to penetrate even the thin armor of American tank destroyers. Once employed, the
tank destroyers quickly eliminated the anti-aircraft guns while the 20mm rounds, which
had been wreaking havoc on American infantry all night, bounced harmlessly off their
hardened exteriors. CPT Brown concludes that the support from the tank destroyers,
coupled with artillery support, enabled the other companies to begin crossing. In turn,
those reinforcements allowed CPT Brown to resume his attack and seize the objective.306
Sitting high on the ridge overlooking St Goarshausen, PFC Gallagher witnessed
the effect the American armored vehicles had there. Just before daybreak, he heard the
familiar clinking of tracked vehicles moving into position near him. Once the sun rose, he
saw an awesome display of military power.
There were tanks and tank destroyers lined up along the rim, about one hundred feet
apart, for the entire length of the town down in the valley. There were about twelve to our
right and they extended as far to our left as we could see. Some were up close to the rim
while others were farther back. We had seen some of the Third Army's armored might
before, but never anything of this magnitude. The sight was almost surreal, with the
morning ground fog hiding the vehicles tracks and their turrets and cannons protruding
through looking like a sea of turtles.307
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The American armor at St Goarshausen sat on the ridge waiting for further orders until
about 0800, when they began to bombard the German defenders on the other side. The
intensity of the firepower left observers marveling at the coordinated and powerful effect
they produced. By 1100, the tanks and tank destroyers had degraded the German
positions enough to allow the reserve company to make it across the Rhine Gorge. PFC
Gallagher describes the role of the armored vehicles in detail, noting that they turned the
tide of the battle and allowed the American infantrymen to finally succeed after a long
night of struggling to maneuver against the German anti-aircraft and machine gun
positions.308 Although the official reports clearly note the presence of armor assets and
even reference some of their actions, it is only in the accounts of soldiers who observed
the battle where their crucial role in the eventual success of the crossing can be found.
In addition to American armor, American aircraft played a crucial role in the
battle, finding their way into several veteran accounts. As with the armor assets, the
eyewitness accounts prove how important the aircraft were in overcoming the initial
setbacks of the crossing. There are significant discrepancies about the planes,
demonstrating why their individual stories are unreliable. Fortunately, there was more
than one veteran who witnessed the events, and it is possible to compare accounts to
reconcile them rather than discounting them entirely. The process of reconciliation
illustrates how a strong consolidated perspective can be distilled.
Some veterans mention the planes in passing, like TEC5 Woodard who only says
that P-51 Mustangs (an American fighter plane) assisted during the day with strafing runs
against German positions.309 PFC Waldner and PFC Leveque provide an interesting
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additional detail, claiming that two Messerschmitts (German fighter planes) attacked the
Americans at the Rhine Gorge until the P-51s engaged them in a dogfight and destroyed
one of the German planes.310 Contradicting their account, CPT Brown notes that six
planes arrived at the Rhine Gorge at 1345 eliminating multiple German 20mm guns—all
six of those planes being P-51 Mustangs with no German aircraft in the area. He also
witnessed a plane being shot down but states that it was a P-51 destroyed by the German
anti-aircraft guns.311
PFC Gallagher was assigned to an anti-aircraft battalion, so he was sharply
attuned to what was happening in the air. He authoritatively states that only American
aircraft arrived at the Rhine Gorge, but during the confusing battle some of the P-51s
conducted a strafing run on American positions along the west bank. Their actions caused
many of the Americans, including some of the anti-aircraft crews, to mistake them for
German planes. In one of the tragedies of war, one of the American anti-aircraft guns
engaged and destroyed a P-51 Mustang, believing it to be a Messerschmidt.312
Understanding PFC Gallagher’s perspective explains the discrepancies. While the
conclusions of the other veterans were incorrect, the fundamental presence and
importance of American planes was consistent throughout the accounts, providing a
reliable consolidated perspective.
Another crucial point can be pulled from the accounts of fighter planes—the
destruction of the P-51 was a fratricide incident like the American mortars landing on the
west bank as described by CPT Brown. In another example of possible fratricide, CPT
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Brown tried to assist his soldiers who were engaged during the initial crossing by setting
up a support by fire position with his machine guns. His battalion executive officer had to
order a cease fire as soon as they initiated because there was no way of knowing the
location of any soldiers on the far side.313 Undoubtedly there were cases of fratricide that
went unnoticed or at least unrecorded. Chaos and confusion in modern combined arms
warfare can easily lead to fratricide as it becomes difficult to distinguish forces on the
battlefield. Although the fratricide was tragic, the P-51s destroying German positions did
provide the support needed for the infantry to make it across the river.
Support from armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft eventually allowed
American troops to successfully take their objective across the Rhine Gorge, but the
accounts of soldiers who participated contain a palpable feeling of distrust in the
American senior leaders who planned the operation. SGT Coffey argues that the initial
waves were sent over to test the strength of the German defenses, since no one would
have knowingly sent soldiers against such positions without providing more support for
the initial push. He likely misunderstood the reasoning of American senior leaders—they
clearly intended to conduct a surprise attack with the lack of support being part of that
plan. However, SGT Coffey was right to conclude that “the crossing should not have
been attempted until air and artillery strikes had further weakened the German
defenses.”314 Rather than analyzing the tactics, PFC Jochen doubts the necessity of the
entire mission in his account. He claims that it was only conducted in order to allow LTG
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Patton to publicly brag about the achievements of Third Army who crossed the Rhine in
more locations than any other unit.315
Providing a more tangible account of distrust in senior leaders, SSG Bowling
speaks of a negative interaction he had with LTC Benson, the commander of 2-354th IN,
who SSG Bowling refers to as “the snake.” After making it across with one of the initial
waves during the night, SSG Bowling and his men had spent hours engaging in close
quarter combat throughout St Goarshausen. The rest of the battalion arrived on the east
side mid-morning, providing a short opportunity for SSG Bowling and his men to quickly
cram down some of their canned rations before proceeding with their attack. While they
were eating, LTC Benson entered the room they were occupying and immediately began
to yell at the soldiers for failing to render a salute when they saw him.316 The commander
failed to understand the tactical situation on the ground and see that customs and
courtesies were hardly a priority in the middle of a battle. His lack of recognition for
what his own soldiers had gone through just hours earlier as they crossed the Rhine
Gorge was just one example of why his men did not respect or trust him.
In his analysis of the Rhine Gorge crossing, CPT Brown concludes that the
mission was overall a success, but provides three pages of criticism, explaining how it
could have been conducted without causing so many casualties. Like others, he notes the
lack of artillery and armored vehicle support for the initial waves, as well as the late
utilization of motorized boats.317 Since he was writing a paper for an army school, it is
not surprising that CPT Brown maintains an incredibly professional tone throughout his
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analysis. However, the number of critiques he provides as well as the specificity of his
critiques reveals a deep distrust in the higher-level planning that went into the Rhine
Gorge crossing. The most obvious examples of his distrust are found in phrases like
“there is no such thing as a secret crossing” and “this crossing was a hurried up affair”
and “the use of smoke… would have reduced casualties.”318 In spite of his
professionalism, a hint of resentment shines through in CPT Brown’s account of his
experiences during the Rhine Gorge crossing.
It is certainly possible that CPT Brown was deflecting responsibility for some of
his own failures. While there are no surviving critiques of CPT Brown, the division
history records the dates every commander served in that position. CPT Brown served
from March 16, 1945 through April 1, 1945—only 15 days. The reason for his short
command is not clear, but his replacement remained in place for the remainder of the war
and received a Silver Star, the third highest award for war service, while CPT Brown
received no award.319 It is possible CPT Brown was removed because of what happened
to his company at the Rhine Gorge, which would give him reason to later justify his own
actions for posterity. Such analysis does not negate CPT Brown’s observations, but it
does mean he could have overstated the failures of others. Fortunately, the core points he
made can be corroborated by other sources.
Throughout all the stories, a fundamental distrust in the decisions of senior
leaders is unmistakable. The analysis of each veteran is unique, but the overall theme is
consistent: serious mistakes were made. The river was destructively dangerous in the
Rhine Gorge, making it a poor crossing site. At the lowest levels, the preparations were
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rushed and unorganized, which reflects poorly on the planning of parent units. Most
importantly, the surprise attack was a misguided strategy and there was not enough prior
coordination to quickly execute a combined arms attack after the surprise failed.
When comparing the surviving personal accounts of the Rhine Gorge crossing, it
is easy to get bogged down in the details, noting the inconsistencies and areas in which
they conflict with each other. Such problems are to be expected considering the stresses
of combat as well as the amount of time that elapsed between the events themselves and
the writing of the accounts. While times and places are easily misremembered, recurring
details and shared feelings about the crossing create a reliable generalized eye-witness
perspective. Veteran narratives do not provide the exact speed and temperature of the
Rhine River, but they do express how the water felt to all the soldiers who nearly
drowned there. It is impossible to know how many German anti-aircraft guns were firing
based on personal stories—in fact, the stories vary wildly—but those same stories are the
only place that the psychological impact of 20mm rounds shredding through a wooden
rowboat can be found and how that impact affected the battle on the ground.
The veterans make it clear that the crossing was tragic and terrible, not simply a
shining example of American military might. While the tragedy of the crossing is a
product of a specific perspective that does not tell the whole story, it is a perspective that
has not previously been factored into analysis of the Rhine Gorge. Therefore, the stories
of the soldiers on the ground are essential and should not be ignored or forgotten.
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CONCLUSION
ADJUSTING THE NARRATIVE
Both the monumental achievements of the U.S. government and its
many foreign policy setbacks can be attributed to the nation’s
constructed identity as an exceptional world power uniquely qualified
not simply to dominate but to remake the world order in its own image.
—American Foreign Policy Since World War II320

In reading the accounts of veterans, one fundamental point becomes painfully
clear: the American military made significant mistakes in crossing the Rhine Gorge. By
comparing the accounts to each other as well as the other available sources, it is possible
to identify four specific mistakes made by senior leaders: they chose a poor crossing site,
they rushed the operation, they inappropriately attempted a surprise attack, and they
failed to coordinate for a combined arms operation involving multiple enablers.
Recognizing these mistakes as failures on the part of leaders is necessary in order to
explore why they were not previously recognized and revise the narrative accordingly.
Senior leaders made the mistake of choosing to cross the Rhine River in a location
that so heavily favored the defenders. LTG Middleton was likely the person responsible
for that idea. Familiar with the area due to his experiences in World War I, he was
convinced that the Germans would not expect an attack there. Additionally, he was
desperate to keep his troops as LTG Patton looked to shift combat power away from LTG
Middleton’s sector. 321 Crossing the Rhine Gorge was a bold plan that flew in the face of
conventional wisdom, promoted by a man that needed to take such a risk to maintain his
prominent position as the Allies drove into Germany. Certainly the gregarious personality
of LTG Patton allowed the decision to stand, and the inability of MG Finley to dissuade
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his commander or offer a satisfactory alternative compounded the mistake, but ultimately
it was LTG Middleton who was most responsible for choosing to cross the dangerous
Rhine Gorge. Even though some, including LTG Middleton, would later focus on the
captured objective and describe the operation as a tactical success, the decision was
fundamentally a mistake that unnecessarily cost the lives of many American soldiers.
Senior leadership’s decision to conduct a rushed operation considering the
complexity of crossing in a dangerous location like the Rhine Gorge was another error.
After deciding to cross, leaders should have proceeded with great care, ensuring that all
the necessary preparations were made. Instead, speed was emphasized at every echelon,
rather than deliberate planning. The emphasis on speed originated with GEN Bradley as
he sought to capitalize on the opportunity created for his 12th Army Group by the capture
of Remagen. Once his forces took a lead role, GEN Bradley did not want to cede that role
by failing to exploit the opportunity to cross at multiple locations and spearhead the thrust
into Germany. He turned to LTG Patton, the master of speed, to accomplish his intent. 322
As American forces rushed to make it across the Rhine, the small unit leaders hastily
struggled to adequately prepare their men for the dangerous mission they had been given.
Most importantly, senior leaders chose to attempt a surprise attack in the Rhine
Gorge, which turned out to be the single greatest mistake. Responsibility for that decision
falls squarely on the shoulders of MG Finley because he had all the assets necessary to
conduct a deliberate crossing rather than a surprise attack. There is no surviving record
explaining why he chose a surprise attack, but careful analysis offers two logical
possibilities. One is that it was the most expedient method and could be executed more
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quickly as senior allied leaders stressed speed. The other possibility is that MG Finley
genuinely believed it to be the best chance for success. The crossing at Oppenheim had
recently caught the enemy off guard, which could have factored into his decision. If
Oppenheim provided the precedence, he should have recognized that the enemy would be
more prepared for such tactics after they had just been fooled. Perhaps MG Finley simply
believed surprise attacks were always the best option. His writings on the tactical
advantages offered by night attacks indicate as much. 323 If so, it can only be said that MG
Finley was wrong. He judged that surprising the enemy by attacking at night would be
successful, but it was not.
There were multiple factors contributing to the failure of a surprise attack in the
Rhine Gorge. The Germans saw the Americans preparing for an attack days before it was
executed. Attempting to surprise the Germans led to paddling wooden boats rather than
using motorized boats, with devastating results. In addition, maintaining surprise
prevented American mortars from registering before the fight began, which would have
allowed them to accurately drop smoke rounds onto the east side and cover the movement
of friendly forces once they were compromised. Ultimately, the surprise attack led to all
armored assets being postured for follow on operations rather than being in position to
provide covering fire across the river. At least some of those assets were eventually
moved into position, which was a decisive factor in the ultimate success of the 89th ID.
Similarly, artillery and air assets were not prepared to support the initial crossings.
The final mistake made by senior leaders during the Rhine Gorge crossing was
failing to properly coordinate a combined arms operation. Even though they were
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attempting a surprise attack, there should have been extensive coordination prior to the
attack for how direct fire from armored assets and machine guns, indirect fire from
mortars and artillery, and aerial support would be deconflicted if their employment was
necessary. The fratricide incidents exemplify why that sort of planning was important.
Failure to plan for the potential use of every weapon system left the 89th ID incapable of
properly supporting their initial crossings once the element of surprise was lost.
After noting the clear mistakes made by American military leaders, the historical
record must be analyzed to determine why the mistakes were not widely acknowledged
after the fact, which is why the perspectives of all available sources are so important. The
leaders who generated the initial reports had no interest in bringing attention to their
mistakes, and the official histories did not see a need to portray the crossings as failures
since they ultimately succeeded. The generals who wrote their own accounts were
concerned enough with their legacy that they did not explore these mistakes—especially
since no one was asking about them. Finally, the media was incorporated into the war
effort, and fully endorsed the narrative promoting the military. After all, the American
public seemed to want stories about American power and success, not American
mistakes. Together, all these sources created the original narrative of the Rhine Gorge
crossings as well as the entire war.
The pre-eminent voice for the original World War II narrative is the green books,
or United States Army in World War II. The specific author responsible for covering the
Rhine Gorge is MacDonald, and he whole-heartedly supports the core theme of the green
books—that the American military was the greatest fighting force in modern warfare.
Authors such as MacDonald occasionally overlook mistakes made by American officers
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in places like the Rhine Gorge in order to support that theme. But why is it so important
for them to maintain the narrative of overwhelming American exceptionalism? Their
purpose is likely nested in the purpose of GEN Eisenhower’s autobiography: promoting
American power to expand foreign policy and confront the Soviet Union.
The power of portraying the United States military in World War II as an
unstoppable force cannot be understated. American exceptionalism did more than simply
justify aggressive foreign policy—it required aggressive foreign policy. Logically, the
possession of a military that is presumed to be all-powerful incurs a moral obligation to
confront evil wherever it exists. Once that presumption is accepted, the discussion shifts
to the definition and identification of evil with little thought given to the limitations of the
military. Therefore, America’s foreign policy following World War II was inextricably
linked with a specific interpretation of the war. That interpretation enabled the United
States to aggressively confront the expansion of the Soviet Union and communism, but it
also resulted in a lasting obligation to control global events after the Soviet Union fell.
The felt obligation to use military power superseded politics over multiple
administrations as American influence extended into regions such as the Middle East, the
Horn of Africa, the Balkans, and North Africa. Although the World War II tactical
narrative is not solely responsible for subsequent foreign policy, it is undeniably linked to
the actions of the United States following the war.
The success of the American military, amplified by the original narrative, also
shaped how the military saw itself. Setbacks during the Cold War and beyond were
contrasted with the embellished memory of unmitigated World War II success. The
presumption of an all-powerful military required the production of new capabilities in
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order to meet the expectations of the country. With the investment of resources, the
military adapted to meet those expectations, reinforcing the initial presumption rather
than challenging it. Consequently, further military success and unprecedented capabilities
only bolstered the felt obligation to use the military to solve both real and perceived
problems throughout the world.
Considering the influence of the original narrative, it is important to understand
how and why it has been revised over the years as well as delineate the elements that
have remained unchanged. With the expansive breadth of research that has been
conducted and the innumerable volumes that have been written about World War II, there
is surprisingly little introspection within this field of history. The sheer mass of research
on the topic has resulted in a historiography that is immense yet congruous. Tasked with
outlining the general histories of World War II, historian Donald Schilling asserts, “the
war as defined and depicted in the late 1940s and early 1950s has remained strikingly
consistent over the decades.”324 Referring to the consistency of debated subjects,
Schilling’s comment belies the incredible durability of the original narrative.
Beyond the original narrative, there are two general types of World War II
history: idealistic revision and mythological story telling. For years, the idealistic
revisions have focused on the highest strategic levels including Germany’s inability to
defeat the Soviet Union, the importance of the Mediterranean front, the postwar role of
the Soviet Union, and the use of the atomic bomb.325 That tradition has expanded to cover
domestic issues, with historians analyzing World War II through the lenses of gender,
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sexuality, and race.326 Even though they dig into incredibly specific details, such histories
are still idealistic because they are revising the historical record by exploring aspects that
were previously ignored without seriously questioning details about the operations and
battles that took place.
Strikingly similar from a methodological standpoint, the mythologizing story
tellers also rarely question operational aspects of World War II. These historians, often
producing extremely popular books, attempt to portray the war through the lens of the
individual soldier. In doing so, they elevate the character of the American soldier to a
level that occasionally pushes the boundaries of realistic assessments. Stephen Ambrose,
one of the premier authors in this category, describes his own approach in the
introduction to his book, Citizen Soldiers: “It is about the GIs, the junior officers and
enlisted men of ETO—who they were, how they fought, why they fought, what they
endured, how they triumphed.”327 Ambrose has no interest in examining the tactical
aspects of the war or the decisions of senior leaders unless it contributes to his portrayal
of the American soldier as the archetypal hero overcoming hardships. Of note, Ambrose
discusses the crossing of the Rhine, but only mentions the capture of the Ludendorff
Bridge at Remagen.328 Mythologizing story tellers focus so intently on describing the
experiences of the American soldier, they largely miss the larger implications embedded
in their stories—the details that conflict with the original narrative.
In the 1950s, historian Michael Howard began to push for a more wholistic
approach to military history, rather than focusing on “the technical aspects of combat.”329
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Howard’s argument makes sense because World War II was an expansive war, with an
impact that extended far beyond the battlefield. Conversely, events that occurred
thousands of miles from the gunfire sometimes played decisive roles in the ultimate
outcome of the war. But there is one organization that is still keenly interested in the
technical aspects of combat: the United States Army. As most historians have migrated to
a more wholistic approach, the historians employed by the military have taken sole
responsibility for detailing the tactical aspects of the war. They use official reports and
personal accounts from senior leaders to piece together a cohesive account. Combined
with the media record, their work has defined the original narrative of World War II, and
since most historians have little interest in the tactical and technical aspects of the war,
the original narrative has remained unchallenged on that level.
The efforts of the American military to understand and preserve the tactical and
operational history of armed conflicts have not been limited to the World War II
narrative. The Center of Military History has produced analysis for nearly every military
action that followed, often in the form of green books just like the original works
covering World War II. Their analysis is comprehensive and thoughtful, but it is
unavoidably limited by the same issues of perspective that impact the original green
books. Therefore, it must be supplemented with additional perspectives and
complementary research that is capable of challenging core elements of narratives in
ways that the military alone cannot. The layering of perspectives on the crossing of the
Rhine Gorge by the 89th ID illustrates how descriptions of seemingly insignificant details
can conflict under scrutiny, revealing important lessons that supersede the immediate
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consequences of the battle. Such layering should not be limited to the Rhine Gorge.
History should never be limited to one perspective.
The crossing of the Rhine Gorge did not win the war. The Allies had already
crossed the Rhine at several locations and would have continued their campaign
regardless of what happened there. The struggles encountered at the Rhine Gorge did not
prolong the war either. Strategically, the battle did not matter. But historically, it is
extremely significant. The crossing of the Rhine Gorge has been ignored because it does
not fit well into the original narrative of World War II emphasizing American
exceptionalism. That same narrative has played a large part in shaping the choices of
American leaders and has consequently impacted global events.
The Rhine Gorge story is like a crack in a dam—a well-hidden dam. It reveals the
existence of a narrative that was crafted politically but has remained unchallenged even
as politics change. It demonstrates the need for critical analysis into how military leaders
conducted the war, not just at the strategic level but also at the tactical and operational
levels. It allows for more refined critiques of the United States, reframing notions that
have dominated its identity for decades. What if the actions of the United States military
in World War II are not the gold standard for military operations? What if those leaders
can be critiqued extensively like any other leader? Finding fault with the original
narrative and American leaders in World War II does not completely undermine the
history of that period; it simply allows for a more refined approach in specific cases. It
can even alter, either slightly or dramatically, the meaning of a war that reshaped the
world, and it can absolutely change how we use the story of that war in the future.
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APPENDIX A: REFERENCED VETERANS OF THE RHINE GORGE CROSSING
Everett Anderson, Technician Third Grade, Adjutant
HQ/89th ID
Lester Becker, Private First Class, Infantry
E Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
Raleigh Bowling, Staff Sergeant, Infantry
E Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Squad Leader
Sol Brandell, Private First Class, Infantry
HQ/355th IN, 89th ID
Paul Brown, Captain, Infantry
A Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Company Commander
John Cain, Private First Class, Infantry
Service Co/355th IN, 89th ID
William Carver, Private First Class, Infantry
E Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Donald Chase, Private First Class, Infantry
K Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Murray Coffey, Sergeant
Anti-tank Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Section Leader
Jim Connell, First Lieutenant, Infantry
A Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
Platoon Leader
Oscar Friedensohn, Private, Engineer
C Co/168th ENG, 7th AD
Robert Gallagher, Private First Class, Field Artillery
815th Anti-Aircraft BN
Mathew Hanks, Sergeant, Infantry
M Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
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Elmer Herbaly, Private First Class, Infantry
C Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Machine Gunner
James Jochen, Private First Class, Infantry
K Co/355th IN, 89th ID
Matt Landers, Technician Fifth Grade, Infantry
Service Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
Colby LaPlace, Technical Sergeant, Infantry
I Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Platoon Sergeant
Al Lasche, Staff Sergeant, Infantry
Service Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Eric Leiseroff, Private First Class, Infantry
E Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
Phillip Leveque, Private First Class, Infantry
HQ/2-354th IN, 89th ID
Harold Mathews, Sergeant, Infantry
C Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
Clarence Petoske, Sergeant, Engineer
B Co/314th ENG, 89th ID
Squad Leader
George Pusey, First Lieutenant, Infantry
E Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Platoon Leader
Ed Quick, Private First Class, Field Artillery
B Battery/340th FA, 89th ID
Donald Robertson, Private First Class, Infantry
B Co/354th IN, 89th ID
Clyde Solmon, Private First Class, Infantry
HHC/353rd IN, 89th ID
Leonard Waldner, Private First Class, Infantry
Cannon Co/353rd IN, 89th ID
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Cornelius Woodard, Technician Fifth Grade, Signal
HQ, 89th ID
Robert Woodrum, Technician Fifth Grade, Field Artillery
A Battery/341st FA, 89th ID
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